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where in the world .... There is no excuse for this. No person can
place it upon a scientific basis; it is a question of feeling.'
Clarence Darrow
I. INTRODUCTION
An enlightened society knows that race should not determine the qual-
ity of justice a person receives. Certainly, an enlightened criminal justice
system would not allow race to determine a person's fate. However, the
Texas criminal justice system, sanctioned by its highest appellate court for
criminal matters, allows a person's race to be considered as a factor in
determining whether that person should receive the death penalty.2
On September 15, 1999, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals3 issued
an unpublished opinion4 in the case of Victor Hugo Saldano v. The State
of Texas.' In Saldano, the court upheld the imposition of the death pen-
alty where the jury heard testimony from an expert witness who stated
that a person's race is a factor that should be considered by a jury in
1. CLARENCE DARROW, VERDICTS OUT OF COURT 70 (1963).
2. See Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (refusing to review
issue because no objection was made at trial); Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 440-41 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2001) (holding defense attorney was not ineffective for eliciting testimony from
expert that race is a factor in determining future dangerousness). But ee TEx. CoOn
CRiM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2001) (providing for the prohibition
of the State's use of race in capital sentencing proceedings).
3. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is the highest state court in Texas deciding
criminal cases. TEx. CONST. art. V, § 3.
4. Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 77.2, the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals of Texas may decide not to publish any opinion if a majority of the justices so decide,
TEX. R. App. P. 77.2. Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Texas, which is the highest court
in Texas handling civil cases, has no such option. See TEx. R. App. P. 63. Intermediate
appellate courts, which handle both criminal and civil cases, have the option to publish or
not publish their opinions. TEx. R. App. P. 47.3. In deciding whether or nol to publish, the
intermediate appellate courts are required to screen opinions prior to being handed down,
in order to decide whether they meet the criteria required for publication. Id. h11e inter-
mediate appellate court may only publish an opinion if it:
(a) establishes a new rule of law, alters or modifies an existing rule, or applies an
existing rule to a novel fact situation likely to recur in future cases;
(b) involves a legal issue of continuing public interest;
(c) criticizes existing law;
(d) or resolves an apparent conflict of authority.
TEx. R. App. P. 47.4. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas has no such screening
requirement in deciding whether or not to publish its opinion. See generally David M.
Gunn, "Unpublished Opinions Shall not be Cited as Authority:" The Emerging Contours of
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 90(1), 24 ST. MARY'S L. REv. 115, 118 (1992) (distin-
guishing publication rules of Supreme Court of Texas and intermediate appellate courts).
5. Saldano v. State, No. 72,556 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 1999), vacated by 530 U.S.
1212 (2000).
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deciding whether a person will be sentenced to death.6 To some people,
the Saldano case represents just another death penalty sentence affirmed
by Texas' highest criminal appellate court. To others, it represents a dis-
turbing step backward to a time when the color of a person's skin could
determine his or her fate.7
Saldano exemplifies a disturbing trend in Texas jurisprudence. The
case, which the Court of Criminal Appeals chose not to publish, did not
generate any media attention and managed to fly under the radar until
June 2000. It was then that the United States Supreme Court reversed
the case' after Texas Attorney General John Cornyn took the extraordi-
nary step of confessing error as the State's legal representative.9 How-
ever, on remand from the Supreme Court, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals again affirmed Mr. Saldano's death sentence.10 Most perplexing
is how, in today's society, the case managed to go unnoticed for as long as
it did and, moreover, that a case of this nature would even be upheld by
the State's highest criminal appeals court in light of the issues and histori-
cal precedent involved.
This article will examine the history of the use of a person's race in the
legal system, particularly in criminal cases, and detail how the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals' decision in Saldano I and IH represents a radi-
cal departure from historical precedent concerning the prohibition the
use of race in determining a person's fate.
H. SALDANO V. STATE
Victor Hugo Saldano, a citizen of Argentina, was charged with capital
murder in Texas and the State sought the death penalty.1 Mr. Saldano
6. Id.
7. See Rick Casey, Suprenes Overrule Texas Lynch Mob, SAN AN-oIo Expa-ss-
NEws, June 7, 2000, at 3A, available at 2000 WL 27525299.
8. Saldano v. Texas, 530 U.S. 1212 (2000).
9. Id.; see Mark Hansen, Deadly Race Cards?, 86 A.B.A. J. 18 (Sept. 2000); Bruce
Hight, Who Should Speak for Texas? DAs Ask Cornytn, Prosecutors Divided over Bill to
Give Attorney General Top Role in Supreme Court Cases, AusTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN,
Mar. 21, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL 4577297; George Kuempel, Cornyn, Court in
Rare Clash: Debate over Death-Sentence Testimony Called Unprecedented, DALLAS MORN-
ING NEws, Jan. 31, 2001, at 1A, available at 2001 WL 11658636.
10. Saldano v. State, 70 S.W. 3d 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Hereinafter, the 1999
opinion will be referred to as Saldano, and the 2002 opinion will be referred to as Saldano
IL
11. Saldano v. State, No. 72,556, slip op. at 1 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 1999), vacated
by 530 U.S. 1212.
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was accused of kidnapping Paul King from a grocery store parking lot.l"
The evidence showed that Mr. Saldano and an accomplice took Mr. King
to a secluded country road where Mr. Saldano forced Mr. King into the
woods and shot him five times.13 The evidence also showed that Mr.
Saldano stole Mr. King's watch and wallet.' 4 After hearing the evidence,
a jury in Collin County, Texas convicted Mr. Saldano of capital murder in
July 1996.15
A punishment hearing was held to determine if Mr. Saldano should
receive the death penalty.16 At this hearing, the jury was asked to decide,
beyond a reasonable doubt, "whether there is a probability that [Mr.
Saldano] would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society."' 7 The State's evidence, admitted at the
12. Id., slip op. at 7. An accusation was also made against an alleged accomplice. Id.
See Max B. Baker, Cornyn at Odds Over 7 Death Row Cases, FORT WORTH STAR-Tiet.
GRAM, Feb. 1, 2001, at 9.
13. Saldano, No. 72,556, slip op. at 7 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 1999).
14. Id.
15. Id., slip op. at 1.
16. Id. Had the State of Texas not sought the death penalty, a punishment hearing
would not have been held because a defendant convicted of capital murder where the
death penalty is not sought is subject to a mandatory life sentence. TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROc. ANN. art. 37.071 § 1 (Vernon Supp. 2001). The stated facts would certainly subject
Mr. Saldano to the possible imposition of the death penalty under Texas law. See TEx.
PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(2) (Vernon 1994). In Texas, a murder committed in the course
of committing kidnapping or robbery subjects a defendant to the possible imposition of the
death penalty. Id. Here, Mr. Saldano was convicted of the murder of Mr. King in the
course of Mr. Saldano's commission of the kidnapping and robbery of Mr. King. See
Saldano, No. 72,556, slip op. at 7 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 1999).
17. Saldano, No. 72,556, slip op. at 6-7 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 1999) (quoting Kee.
ton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)). See also TEx. CODIS CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 37.071 §§ 2 (b)(1), (c) (Vernon Supp. 2001). This is often referred to as "future
dangerousness." Steve Lash, Texas Death Case Set Aside; U.S. Supreme Court Sees Possi-
ble Racial Bias, Hous. CHRON., Jun. 6,2000, at Al. In proving that capital murder defend.
ants will constitute a future danger to society, the State is allowed to introduce into
evidence at the punishment phase any matter relevant to sentencing. TEX. CODE CRIM.
PRoc. ANN. art. 37.071 § (2)(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001). This evidence may include:
(1) the circumstances of the capital offense, including the defendant's state of mind
and whether he or she was working alone or with other parties;
(2) the calculated nature of the defendant's acts;
(3) the forethought and deliberateness exhibited by the crime's execution;
(4) the existence of a prior criminal record, and the severity of the prior crimes;
(5) the defendant's age and personal circumstances at the time of the offense;
(6) whether the defendant was acting under duress or the domination of another at the
time of the commission of the offense;
(7) psychiatric evidence; and,
(8) character evidence.
See Keeton, 724 S.W.2d at 61.
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hearing to support the issue of future dangerousness, elevated matters to
a new level in Texas. The State called Dr. Walter Quijano, a licensed
clinical psychologist,' 8 to testify as to Mr. Saldano's "future dangerous-
ness."'" Dr. Quijano testified to twenty-four factors that he felt would
merit a death sentence.' Inappropriately, one of the twenty-four factors
Dr. Quijano referred to was Mr. Saldano's raceP Specifically, Dr.
Quijano testified that various studies" indicate that the number of Afri-
can Americans and Hispanics in Texas prisons is disproportionate to their
percentage in the general population.' He further testified that because
18. See Baker, supra note 12, at 9 (characterizing Dr. Quijano as a "clinical psycholo-
gist"); Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 438, WL 1167494, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)
(characterizing Dr. Quijano as a "clinical psychologist); but see Saldano, No. 72,556, slip
op. at 8 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 1999) (characterizing Dr. Quijano as a "psychiatrist").
19. Saldano, No. 72,556, slip op. at 5 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 1999). One has to
question how Dr. Quijano's race-based testimony was admissible under Rule 702 of the
Texas Rules of Evidence, which governs the admission of expert testimony. See Tnx. R.
EvmD. 702. Before expert testimony is admitted, the trial court must determine if such
testimony is relevant and reliable enough to aid the jury in understanding the evidence or
determining an issue of fact. Mata v. State, 46 S.W.3d 902, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001);
Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); see Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 599 (1993). The inquiry under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 702 is essentially one of relevancy. In determining if the expert testimony is suffi-
ciently reliable, the trial court must determine that the expert's testimony is based on
scientific knowledge derived from sound scientific methods. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
Further, the party seeking to admit the testimony of an expert must prove that the expert
is sufficiently qualified to testify on the proposed subject. Gregory v. State, 56 S.W.3d 164,
178 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd). The trial court must also determine
if the proposed testimony will unduly prejudice the defendant or is othenvise inadmissible
under Rule 403 of the Texas Rules of Evidence. Kelly, 824 S.WV.2d at 573; Tr. R. EviD.
403.
20. Saldano, No. 72,556, slip op. at 10 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 15,1999). Bryan Steven-
son of the Equal Justice Initiative in Montgomery, Alabama referred to the evidence intro-
duced in Saldano's trial as "junk science." See Julie Blasd, Teras Fight Takes on Race and
Death Penalty: Seven Men on Death Row May Be There In Part Because of Race, Attorney
General Says, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONrrOR, Mar. 22, 2001. "Every analysis shows that
people of color don't use drugs more than white people. Yet at each stage of the [criminal
process, people of color loom larger .... it says a lot about the way we arrest, prosecute,
and convict based on race." Id.
21. Saldano, No. 72,556, slip op. at 9-10.
22. Dr. Quijano testified that he had reviewed studies and statistics from the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice and the "Bureau of Justice" although he was unable to
recall the specific "details and mechanics of the studies." Texas v. Saldano, Cause No. 199-
80049-96, 199th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas, Reporter's Record, Vol. 20,
at 115 (on file with author).
23. Saldano, No. 72,556, slip op. at 9 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 1999). At Victor
Hugo Saldano's trial, Dr. Quijano testified on direct examination by the prosecutor as
follows:
Q. Okay. What is the fourth category?
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A. The fourth category is race.
Q. Well, let's talk about that. In this age of political correctness, that somehow it is an
item that we tend to gloss over. But, empirically, there is a statistical analysis of it. Is
that correct?
A. Yes. This is one of those unfortunate realities also that blacks and Hispanics are
over-represented in the criminal justice system.
Q. And there may be social problems for that; we don't know. But that doesn't alter
the fact that, statistically, that's a reality of life.
A. The race itself may not explain the over-representation, so there are other subreali-
ties that may have to be considered. But statistically speaking, 40 percent of inmates
in the prison system are black, about 20 percent are - - about 30 percent are white,
and about 20 percent are Hispanics. So there's much over-representation.
Q. In the category - categorization of races, how is an Argentinean fitted?
A. That - he would be considered a Hispanic.
Reporters Record, supra note 22, at 75-76. Not only did Mr. Saldano's trial defense attor-
ney not object to Dr. Quijano's testimony, he elicited even more of it on cross-
examination:
Q. Now, one of the factors - one of your other statistical factors you mentioned was
the factor of race. Is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And you - you pointed out a fact that's probably pretty well-known to
everybody; that blacks and Hispanics are over-represented in the United States prison
population.
A. Yes.
Q. And, basically, what we mean by that is, if African-American people make up
about 16 percent of the population, but 40 percent of the people in prison are African-
American people, then we can say, Well, if the population in prison corresponded to
the free population, then there should only be 16 percent African-American people in
prison, so that fact that there's only 40 shows that they're over-represented. Right?
A. Yes.
Q. And the same is true of Hispanic people.
A. Yes.
Q. Now, what race is an Hispanic person?
A. What, now?
Q. What race is an Hispanic person?
A. The Hispanic person is Caucasian.
Q. Okay. So why isn't he - why aren't - I mean, so - and white people are Cauca-
sians, aren't they?
A. Yes.
Q. So in your category, you said blacks, Hispanics, and white, and you - let's see it
was blacks are 40 percent, Hispanics are 20 percent, whites are 30 percent. Right?
A. Mm-hmm. Yes.
Q. But if whites are Caucasians and Hispanics are Caucasians, how come we're count-
ing them separately?
A. Because we are engaged now in a word game. The race here is not used in an
anthropological sense. It is simply to explain that blacks, Hispanic heritage, and white
people is commonly known, those are the dissolution of criminals. That I did not
intend to portray a anthropological sense, distinguishing between types of Caucasians
and, you know,--I'm just saying, Hispanic-background people, generally referred to
as Spanish-speaking people, are over-represented, and the statistics show that.
[Vol, 4,261
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Mr. Saldano is a Spanish speaker, he is classified as "Hispanic" for the
purposes of these studies. 24 A fortiori, Mr. Saldano's race could be con-
sidered a factor weighing in favor of a finding of future dangerousness
since there are a disproportionate percentage of Hispanics in prison corn-
Q. Okay. But Spanish - I mean, Hispanics are people who speak Spanish.
A. Yes.
Q. Or come - or come from a cultural background where people speak Spanish. Is
that right?
A. Yes.
Q. But those folks come from all kinds of racial backgrounds, don't they?
A. Yes.
Q. I mean, a person from Madrid, would we call him an Hispanic?
A. If he was in the United States, yes.
Q. All right. And a person from Madrid might very well have as fair a skin as an
Irishman and have blonde hair, mightn't he?
A. Yes.
Q.... Now, the Hispanics that have been considered in coming up with these statisti-
cal factors are the Hispanics that are in American prisons. Is that correct?
A. Or American criminal justice system.
Q. All right. And do you think it would be fair to say that the overwhelming majority
of those Hispanics would be Mexican people?
A. In this part of the country, yes. In the East Coast, Puerto Ricans.
Q. Okay. And, I mean, Mexico had a large population of Indian people at the time of
the Spanish Conquest. Is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. And so many Mexican people today are mixtures in their blood lines of
Spanish people with Indians.
A. Yes.
Q. All right. Isn't it pretty risky to base a statistical factor on, you know - we're going
to identify everyone who comes from a particular culture as being a member of that
racial group. I mean, I understand, we're not talking - but that's the term you used.
A. Yes.
Q. And yet the racial group that we're using to conduct the statistics does not consist
of all Spanish-speaking people; it consists mostly of a mixture of Indian and Spanish
blood from Mexico. I mean, that's not really a - that doesn't make a whole lot of
scientific sense, does it?
A. It makes sense to me. I don't know if it makes sense to you. Hispanics means,
generally, Spanish-speaking people in the United States, and that can be a mixture of
Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Mexicans, South Americans. For some strange reason, they're
over-represented in the criminal justice system. Now, how much weight you want to
put into that, that is the open question. But I'm reporting the statistics as they are
published.
The State of Texas v. Victor Hugo Saldano, Cause, No. 199-80049-96, 199th Judicial Dis-
trict Court, Collin County, Texas, Reporter's Record, Vol. 20, pp. 127-132 (on file with
author).
24. See Saldano, No. 72,556, slip op. at 9 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 1999). Dr.
Quijano equated Hispanics with people who spoke Spanish. See Reporters Record, supra
note 22.
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pared to the general population.25 Mr. Saldano's defense attorney failed
to object to the admission of Dr. Quijano's testimony.26 The jury found
that Mr. Saldano would be a future danger to society, and he was sen-
tenced to death.27
Mr. Saldano appealed his conviction and death sentence,28 arguing, in-
ter alia, that it was impermissible for the State to allow the jury to con-
sider race in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed.29
On September 15, 1999, the Court of Criminal Appeals issued an unpub-
lished opinion on the case.30 The majority opinion devoted a mere three
paragraphs to the use of race in determining future dangerousness and
held that the failure of Mr. Saldano's defense attorney to object to the
testimony of Dr. Quijano failed to preserve the error for review. 31 The
majority rejected Mr. Saldano's request to consider the interjection of
race into the case as fundamental error under Rule 103(d) of the Texas
Rules of Criminal Evidence.32
Mr. Saldano appealed the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision to the
United States Supreme Court, asking the Supreme Court to consider
whether race is a permissible basis upon which the State can seek the
death penalty.33 In a remarkable response to Mr. Saldano's request, the
25. Saldano, No. 72,556, slip op. at 9 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 1999).
26. Id., slip op. at 10. The defense attorney, David Haynes, in an interview with the
Dallas Morning News after the Supreme Court remanded the case, appears to now under-
stand the impropriety of allowing such testimony, stating, "I can see how it might be offen-
sive to the Constitution." Curtis Howell, Execution Sentence Is Tossed; High Court Faults
Use of Collin Killer's Race, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Jun. 6, 2000, at 25A.
27. Saldano, No. 72,556, slip op. at 1 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 1999).
28. All Texas capital murder convictions in which the death penalty is imposed are
appealed directly to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas and are not first reviewed at
the intermediate appellate court level. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(h)
(Vernon Supp. 2001).
29. Saldano, No. 72,556, slip op. at 9-10 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 1999).
30. See id. Justice Holland did not participate in the decision. Id., slip op. at 1. Justice
Cheryl Johnson concurred in affirming the judgment of conviction but dissented to the
affirming of the death sentence imposed. Id. Judge Tom Price dissented. Id.
31. Id., slip op. at 10.
32. Id.; TEX. R. EVID. 103(d). For a discussion of the fundamental error rule, see
Hulen D. Wendorff et al., Texas Rules of Evidence Manual 1-52-54 (4th ed. 1997).
33. See Jane Elliot, Cornyn Vows to Fight for Inmate; AG Pushes Jbr New Sentencing
Hearing, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 1, 2001, at Al. Stanley Schneider, Saldano's appellate attor-
ney, urged the Supreme Court to vacate the death sentence, calling it "fundamentally un-
fair for the prosecution to use racial and ethnic stereotypes in order to obtain the death
penalty." Lash, supra note 17; see also Roger Hernandez, The Effect of Ethnicity on Sen-
tencing, DALLAS MORNING NEws, June 21, 2000, at 17A (stating imposition of death pen-
alty should not be based on ethnicity, but only on individual behavior).
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Attorney General for the State of Texas, John Cornyn,34 confessed error
on behalf of the State. 5 The Attorney General stated in his response:
Despite the fact that sufficient proper evidence was submitted to the
jury to justify the finding of Saldano's future dangerousness, the infu-
sion of race as a factor for the jury to weigh in making its determina-
tion violated his constitutional right to be sentenced without regard
to the color of his skin.3 6
On June 5, 2000, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion
vacating the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, and
remanded it "for further consideration in light of the confession of error
by the Solicitor General of Texas."37 The Court of Criminal Appeals
then set Mr. Saldano's case for rehearing and permitted supplemental
briefing regarding the issue of race and future dangerousness.38 Oral ar-
gument was held on February 28, 2001.39 Race and future dangerousness
34. The Republican Texas Attorney General identified several other death penalty
cases in which Dr. Quijano testified concerning race as a factor to be weighed in determin-
ing a defendant's future dangerousness. See Elliot, supra note 33, at A19; Casey, supra
note 7, at 3A; see also Press Release, John Cornyn, Office of the Attorney General, State
of Texas (June 9, 2000) (on file with author).
35. Saldano v. Texas, 530 U.S. 1212 (2000). Apparently the Attorney General's con-
fession of error was not agreed to by the Collin County District Attorney. See Kuempel,
supra, note 9 at 1A. The article reported on the clash between the Attorney General and
the District Attorney. Id. In fact, the Court of Criminal Appeals questioned the Attorney
General's authority to confess error on behalf of the State of Texas and ordered all parties
to brief the issue of the Attorney General's authority. Id. Interestingly, the court ordered
the briefing on this issue just one day after the general election was held. See Mary Alice
Robbins, Court Questions AG's Authority; CCA Wants Briefs on Cornyn's Right to Re-
present State in Criminal Cases at U.S. Supreme Court, TExAs LAWVYER, Nov. 13, 2000, at 1.
The order was issued November 8th. Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals issued its opinion
in Saldano If one day after the 2002 primary elections, affirming Mr. Saldano's death sen-
tence and holding that the Texas Attorney General may represent the State in criminal
matters before the United States Supreme Court, but only if asked to do so by the district
attorney's office which tried the case. See Saldano v. State, 70 S.AV.3d 873 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002).
36. Casey, supra note 7.
37. Saldano v. Texas, 530 U.S. 1212 (2000).
38. See Mary Alice Robbins, AG Argues Race Shouldn't Be Factor ii: Death Sentence;
CCA Asked to Grant New Sentencing Hearing for Argentine, TEXAS LAWvYER, Mar. 5,2001,
at 1. Robbins reported on oral arguments heard after the Supreme Court remand. Id. In
addition to the Attorney General's brief and that of Saldano, an Amicus Curiae brief was
filed by the League of United Latin American Citizens, the National Council of La Raza,
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the Texas Catholic Conference, the
Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., and the Mexican American
Bar Association. Id.
39. ILd.
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as well as the Attorney General's authority to represent Texas in criminal
cases before the United States Supreme Court were at issue.40
On March 13, 2002, the Court of Criminal Appeals issued its opinion in
Saldano I. 41 The court first addressed the authority of the Texas Attor-
ney General to confess error before the Supreme Court. The court noted
that Texas statutory law requires a district attorney to request assistance
from the Attorney General's office before the Attorney General is em-
powered to represent the State before the Supreme Court in certiorari
proceedings.42 The court held that the district attorney's acquiescence in
allowing the Attorney General to respond on behalf of the State to Mr.
Saldano's petition for writ of certiorari was an implied request for assis-
tance, and, therefore, the Attorney General was permitted to confess er-
ror in Mr. Saldano's case before the Supreme Court. 3
However, the court held the Attorney General's confession of error did
not require the court to "blindly" overrule Saldano.44 Specifically, the
court stated that the issue to which the Attorney General confessed error
was not one which had been presented to or decided by the Texas courts
previously, because, as the court held in Saldano, no objection was made
to Dr. Quijano's testimony at trial, and, therefore, no issue was preserved
for appellate review.4
The court then attempted to justify their determination that, absent an
objection, the interjection of race in determining the defendant's future
dangerousness was not the type of error which warranted reversal of the
case. The court opined that the complained of error was merely an evi-
dentiary matter requiring an objection to preserve it for appellate re-
view.46 The court also stated that most errors of constitutional dimension
40. See id.
41. Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). All nine justices joined in
Part I of the opinion and seven justices joined in Part II. Id. at 875. Justices Price and
Johnson dissented from Part II. Id. at 891. A concurring opinion was filed by Justice Kel-
ler, in which Justices Keasler, Hervey and Cochran joined. Id. at 891-92.
42. Id. at 880.
43. Id. at 883-84. All nine justices joined in this portion of the opinion. Id. at 875.
44. Id. at 884. In fact, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated it did not base its
decision in Saldano Ion federal law but based it on a state procedural rule, i.e., the require-
ment of an objection to preserve the issue for appellate review. Id. The error presented in
Saldano's petition to the United States Supreme Court involved federal constitutional
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 891. The Court of Criminal Appeals
stated no such federal constitutional claim was presented to or ruled on by them previously
and, therefore, the remand of the case by the Supreme Court for clarification of the basis
of the holding was not surprising to them. Id.
45. Id. at 891.
46. Id. at 886-87.
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require an objection to be preserved for appellate review.47 Further, the
court opined that even if the State had offered Dr. Quijano's testimony
solely for the purpose of appealing to racial prejudices, Mr. Saldano's
defense attorney was still required to object to the admission of this evi-
dence in order to preserve the error for appellate review.48
In an attempt to further bolster its holding that the admission of race-
based evidence did not warrant reversal of Mr. Saldano's death sentence,
the court stated that the defense attorney's failure to object to the intro-
duction of Dr. Quijano's testimony did not constitute ineffective assis-
tance of counsel.4 9 On this basis, and despite the confession of error by
47. Id. at 887. The Court stated the error complained of was not within one of the two
categories of error which may be reviewed on appeal when an objection is not lodged at
trial. Id. at 889. These two types of error as identified by the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals are the denial of a right which requires a waiver and absolute requirements. See
Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Absolute requirements in-
clude the requirement of a court to have jurisdiction over the subject matter and person,
the requirement that proceedings be held at the county seat, the requirements that the
statute not be an ex post facto prohibition and not violate the Separation of Powers provi-
sion of the Texas Constitution, and that a trial judge's comments may not impinge on the
defendant's right to a presumption of innocence. See also Saldano, 70 S.W.3d at 888 (citing
Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 279 (jurisdictional and separation of powers requirements), Stine v.
State, 908 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (court at county seat requirement), Ieppert v.
State, 908 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (ex post facto prohibition), Blue v. State, 41
S.W.3d 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (plurality opinion recognizing judge's comments on
presumption of innocence as fundamental error)). The opinion in Saldano 11 never cites to
Texas Rule of Evidence 103(d), which allows the courts to address "fundamental errors
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court."
See generally Tax. R. EVID. 103(d). However, they do cite to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 52(b) which states that "[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may
be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court." FaD. R. CrIM. P.
52 (b); Saldano, 70 S.W. 3d at 889.
48. Saldano, 70 S.W.3d at 887 n.58 (citing Brooks v. State, 990 S.W.2d 278,286 (Tex.
Crim. App.), cert denied, 528 U.S. 956 (1999)). The court relied on Brooks v. State for the
proposition that an objection is required to preserve an error relating to the introduction of
testimony which would appeal to racial prejudices of the jury. Id. In Brooks, a death
penalty case, the defendant was an African American. See Brooks, 990 S.W.2d at 286.
During the punishment phase the State introduced the testimony of a white man concern-
ing the "negative influence" the defendant had on his daughter. Id. at 286 n3. The de-
fense attorney did not object. On appeal Brooks claimed this testimony was impermissible
because it appealed to racial prejudices. Id. at 286. Without any elaboration or analysis,
the Court of Criminal Appeals simply held the issue had not been preserved for appellate
review because no objection was made at the trial court. Id.
49. Saldano, 70 S.W.3d at 886. Despite the lack of evidence as to the defense attor-
ney's reasons for not objecting, the Court supplied two reasons of its own: the defense
attorney was attempting to
(1) place before the jury all the factors it might use against appellant, either properly
or improperly, in its assessment of future dangerousness, and (2) persuade the jury
that, despite all those negative factors, appellant would not be a future danger if im-
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the Attorney General, the court effectively declined to reach the merits
of deciding the propriety of the introduction of race as a factor to be
considered by the jury in determining a defendant's future dangerous-
ness.50 Consequently, the court affirmed the imposition of Mr. Saldano's
death sentence, with only two judges dissenting.51
Justice Johnson filed a dissenting opinion addressing the failure of the
majority to review the merits of the claimed error.5" She stated that the
race or ethnicity of a defendant is an impermissible basis upon which a
determination of guilt or punishment may be assessed.5" Further, she
recognized that it is impossible to measure the effect on the jury when the
factor of race is introduced at trial. 54 She stated she would remand for a
new sentence because a defendant has a right to be punished for "what he
did, not who he is." 55
Justice Price also filed a dissenting opinion stating the introduction of
Dr. Quijano's testimony was fundamental error.56 He emphasized that
punishment decisions in death penalty cases are uniquely susceptible to
the infusion of racial prejudice due to the subjective and individualized
nature of capital sentencing proceedings.57 Justice Price argued that a
defendant has a right to be sentenced free from any racial prejudice and
that a defendant does not waive his right to complain of a racially-infused
sentencing proceeding because of a failure to object at trialP8 Justice
Price stated he could not join with the majority in this case because he
prisoned for life because the system's procedures and techniques would control or
eliminate his tendency toward violence.
Id. The court stated that Mr. Saldano did not raise this issue in his application for writ of
habeas corpus he had filed earlier and upon which they had already ruled. Id. The court
deduced that the failure to include such a claim must mean that the trial attorney made a
conscious choice not to object to Dr. Quijano's testimony, thereby making the failure to
object a trial strategy. Id. See also Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)
(holding by a unanimous judgment in a similar case, that an objection to race-based evi-
dence is required).
50. Saldano, 70 S.W.3d at 891.
51. Id. at 893.
52. Id. (Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Johnson concurred in the
majority's holding that the Attorney General was permitted to represent the State in this
case before the Supreme Court. Id.
53. Id. (Johnson, J. dissenting).
54. Id. at 894. Justice Johnson cites no authority for her opinion.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 892. (Price, J. dissenting) ("I would hold that the admission of this evidence
was fundamental error, which should be reviewed even in the absence of a trial
objection.").
57. Id. at 893.
58. Id at 892.
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was uncertain if racial prejudice was a factor in the jury's decision to im-
pose the death sentence5 9
Chief Justice Keller chided the dissenters, in a concurring opinion to
the majority, for their lack of legal analysis in support of their opinions.
She stated that the dissenters are doing a "disservice to counsel for appel-
lant, who put forward and ably argued a proposed legal basis for granting
relief.",61 She further argued that the majority opinion explains why
Saldano's arguments must fail and that the dissenters had offered no legal
reasons as to the incorrectness of the majority's holding.62
The majority opinion, however, does not provide the analysis Justice
Keller suggests. The opinion wholly fails to mention, much less analyze,
why the error complained of cannot be reviewed under Texas Rule of
Evidence 103(d), which allows courts to review unobjected to errors af-
fecting a defendant's substantial rights.63 Nor does the majority opinion
provide any real analysis as to why it should not be an absolute require-
ment that capital proceedings be free from any racial taint. As can be
seen by the cases presented below, the Court of Criminal Appeals ap-
pears to have simply refused to recognize the fundamental nature of the
error committed in the trial and punishment of Mr. Saldano.
mI[. How THE INTERJECTION OF RACE AT TRIAL HAS BEEN
TREATED IN THE PAST
The majority opinion in Saldano II does not even cite to Rule 103(d) of
the Texas Rules of Evidence, which allows courts to review unobjected to
errors which affect a defendant's substantial rights. 4 Nor does the ma-
jority opinion provide any real analysis explaining why it should not be an
absolute requirement that capital sentencing proceedings be free from
any type of racism. In the opinion issued by the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals in Saldano II, the court apparently ignored historical precedent in
affirming the use of race as a permissible factor in deciding a person's
future dangerousness.
59. Id. at 893.
60. Id. at 891-92 (Keller, P.J. concurring). One commentator has called Judge Keller's
concurring opinion "a snippy response to the dissenters .... " Rick Casey, Texas' Worst
Court Slaps Cornyn, Upholds Nazi-like Quackery, SAN ANroNIO Exrss NEws, Mar. 22,
2002, at 3A.
61. Saldano, 70 S.W.3d at 891-92 (Keller, PJ. concurring).
62. Id. at 892.
63. Tnx. K. EVInD. 103(d).
64. ld.
2002]
THE SCHOLAR
A. Texas Cases Concerning the Use of Race at Trial
In Texas, the interjection of the issue of race into trial has traditionally
been greatly discouraged. This has been particularly pertinent in two ar-
eas: preventing the prosecutor's appeal to racial prejudice in the argu-
ment to the jury, and discouraging the use of race to impugn a witness'
credibility or to show bias in favor of the defendant. In most cases, the
appellate courts have strongly discouraged the use of appeals to racial
prejudice or racial stereotypes. 65
1. The Treatment of the Use of Race at Trial by the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals
Generally, there is little chance of success on appeal from a criminal
conviction and sentence unless an objection is first lodged in the trial
court, thereby ensuring preservation of error.66 Even if a proper, sustain-
able objection is made and the trial judge overrules it, in order to have
the case reversed, a defendant must have somehow been harmed by the
error.6 7 As evidenced by its past decisions, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals has been more willing to find the defendant was harmed by the
interjection of race into a trial. 68 The court's general reasoning for re-
versing the error is due to the recognition that no curative instruction to
disregard the racial remarks of the prosecutor can erase the taint placed
in the jury's mind.69
In the 1925 case of Derrick v. State,7" a white woman was tried and
convicted for aiding in the rape of her twelve-year old maid. Derrick
called her mother to testify on her behalf. During the cross-examination
by the State, the prosecutor, in an obvious attempt to demean the defen-
65. Tex. Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Haywood, 153 Tex. 242, 266 S.W.2d 856, 859-60
(1954) (stating it is unethical for attorneys to use race in arguments or in cross-examination
and judges have a duty to prevent such use); Moss v. Sanger, 75 Tex. 321, 12 S.W. 619, 620
(1889) (stating the trial court would have rebuked and punished the attorney who made
race-based'remarks if the attorney's remarks were understood). See generally, Debra T.
Landis, Annotation, Prosecutor's Appeal in Criminal Case to Racial, National, or Religious
Prejudice as Grounds for Mistrial, New Trial, Reversal, or Vacation of Sentences - Modern
Cases, 70 A.L.R. 4th 664 (1989).
66. See TEx. R. App. P. 33.1. In Saldano I the Court of Criminal Appeals pointed out
that there are very few types of errors which will result in a reversal of the conviction
where the defendant did not first raise an objection at the trial level. See Saldano, 70
S.W.3d at 888.
67. Tsx. R. App. P. 44.2(a).
68. Dinklage v. State, 185 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1945); Hatton v. State, 125
Tex. Crim. 55, 66 S.W.2d 331, 333 (1933); Derrick v. State, 272 S.W. 458 (Tex. Crim. App.
1925).
69. Dinklage, 185 S.W.2d 573; Hatton, 66 S.W.2d at 333; Derrick, 272 S.W. 458.
70. 272 S.W. 458 (1925).
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dant, questioned her about a prostitution charge levied against her
daughter after being caught in bed with a "Negro" man.7t The defense
attorney objected and the trial court sustained the objection. The Court
of Criminal Appeals recognized that no jury instruction to disregard the
question could remove this innuendo from the jury's mind, stating, "[I]t
was utterly impossible for the court to destroy the virus that was spread
by the very asking of the question."'73 In holding that reversible error
occurred, the court stated, "the very asking of it was so repulsive to every
idea of a fair trial."'74
A few years after Derrick, in Blocker v. State," an African-American
tenant farmer was on trial for the murder of a white man.76 During the
trial, witnesses testified the deceased had started the altercation by slap-
ping Blocker, who then stabbed the deceased. 7 In jury argument, the
prosecutor stated that when the deceased slapped Blocker, it "was an ef-
fort on his part to keep this [N]egro in his place, and Southern gentlemen
will not condemn him for it."'78 The defense attorney requested an in-
struction for the jury to disregard the prosecutor's comment, and the trial
judge gave such an instruction.79 Nonetheless, the prosecutor also stated,
71. Id The prosecution's evidence was that Derrick held a knife to the victim while
Derrick's husband had intercourse with her. Id. at 458-59.
72. Id at 459.
73. Id.
74. Id. See also Resendez v. State, 50 S.W.3d 84, 85-86 (Tex. AppNWaco 2001, no
pet.). The failure of the defense to object to the prosecutor's questions regarding the white
female defendant's having sex with black men waived error on appeal. Id. The Waco
Court of Appeals has reluctantly held that a defendant's failure to object to questioning by
the State, which was similar to that in Derrick, did not preserve the issue for review on
appeal. Id. at 86 (citing Brooks v. State, 990 S.W.2d 278,286 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). The
court in Brooks held that the complaint regarding the State's appeal to racial prejudice was
not preserved for appeal absent objection. Id. Ms. Resendez was charged with murdering
her husband. Id at 85. She contended that the killing was in self-defense because her
husband had attempted to rape her. Id. The prosecutor in Resendez asked the defendant
several questions regarding her having had sexual relations with both a white and a black
man. Id at 85-86. The Waco Court noted this issue was not one of first impression and
was therefore obliged to follow the Court of Criminal Appeals' precedent. Id. at 86 (citing
Brooks, 990 S.W.2d at 286). A dissenting opinion was filed by Justice Bill Vance. Id. at 86
(Vance, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Vance stated that the Waco Court should
work towards eradicating racial prejudice. Id. Further, Justice Vance opined that "[t]he
right to a trial free of racial prejudice is... a fundamental, systemic requirement of the
criminal justice system" which does not require an objection to be preserved and is not
subject to a harmless error analysis. Id.
75. 112 Tex. Crim. 275, 16 S.W.2d 253 (1929).
76. Id
77. Id at 253. The altercation started over the deceased taking offense at Mr. Blocker
referring to an older African-American man as "Mister." Id.
78. Id at 254.
79. Id.
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"I have lived in this country all my life and I do not have to tell twelve
Southern men what to do in the case."" The Court of Criminal Appeals
recognized these statements as being "veiled and covert appeal[s] to race
prejudice."'', Citing the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, 82 the court recognized
that if equal protection of the law is to mean anything, a conviction of a
person based on a remark appealing to racial prejudice cannot stand. 3
As in Blocker, the Court of Criminal Appeals found reversible error in
Hatton v. State, 4 where once again the prosecutor appealed to race
prejudice in seeking a conviction for murder. The prosecutor asked a
witness whether Mr. Hatton, an African American, had been previously
charged with insulting two white women in another county.85 Despite the
defense attorney's objection and the trial court's instructions to the jury
to disregard the question, the prosecutor brought up the matter again,
this time by asking the defendant if he had insulted two white women. 6
The defense again objected and the trial court once again sustained the
objection. Despite both these objections being sustained, the prosecutor
argued in his closing argument that if the defendant "was acquitted he
would again be insulting white women .... "87 Again the defense attor-
ney objected and the court instructed the jury to disregard the remarks.88
At the appellate level, the court recognized these remarks as appeals to
racial prejudice in violation of the defendant's right to a fair and impartial
trial.89 In reversing the conviction, the court also recognized that the
harmful effects of the remarks could not be erased from the jury's mind
simply by the trial judge's instructions.90
In yet another case, Dinklage v. State,9 the Court of Criminal Appeals
recognized that one cannot "unring the bell" after the prosecution makes
80. Id. There is no indication in the opinion as to whether an objection was made to
this statement. Id.
81. Id.
82. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV ("no State shall ... deny to any person.., the equal
protection of the laws").
83. Blocker, 16 S.W.2d at 254. The Court of Criminal Appeals further stated that the
defendant is to be tried according to the requisites of the law, not traditions of the South.
Id.
84. 125 Tex. Crim. 55, 66 S.W.2d 331.
85. Id. at 333 (1933).
86. Id. The prosecutor alleged Mr. Hatton had asked the girls to get in his car and had
offered them gum. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 185 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1945).
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improper remarks.92 In Dinklage, which took place during World War H,
the defendant, a Texas citizen of German heritage, was on trial for mur-
der.93 During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the witnesses
for the State were more believable than the defendant, stating in a loud
and vehement tone that the defendant "wants you to believe the story of
that Hun and his wife." 4 The trial judge sustained the defense attorney's
objection to the remark. 5 Although the trial court instructed the jury to
disregard the prosecutor's statement, the prosecutor interjected, turning
towards Mr. Dinklage and strongly stating, "He is a German."96 The
court found the judge's instruction to the jury insufficient to undo the
harmful effect of the remarks,9 7 especially since the prosecutor continued
with the remarks at the same time the judge was giving the instruction.98
The court reversed, finding the prosecutor's remarks to be serious error
which resulted in the denial of a fair trial for Mr. DinklageY9
Derrick, Blocker, Hatton, and Dinklage illustrate that the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals has long recognized that once the jury is exposed to
a racial remark, the harmful effect of that remark cannot be removed
through the use of a curative instruction to disregard the remark. The
court in these cases found that the taint from the mere asking of a ques-
tion or the making of a remark is so great that no jury instruction can
correct the error. Yet, in Mr. Saldano's case, a majority of the court
failed to recognize the incurable effect on the jury that is caused by the
introduction of the defendant's race as an indicator of his propensity to
commit future crimes."°
Akin to the notion that a person is more dangerous because members
of his race are over-represented in the prison population is the notion
that members of certain minorities are willing to lie for one another. In
Allison v. State, 10' the Court of Criminal Appeals found reversible error
92. Id.
93. Id. at 574-75.
94. Id. at 574. The prosecutor placed emphasis on the term "Hun." Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. The word "Hun" refers to a "German" or a person with a barbarous or cruel
disposition. Id. at 575.
97. Id. at 575. The appellate record showed that one prosecution witness was in a
United States Army soldier's uniform, that the United States was involved in a war against
the" German government, and that no evidence had been presented as to Mr. Dinklage's
ancestry. Id. at 574.
98. Id. at 575.
99. Id. at 576. The court recognized that Texas is "a melting pot of many nationalities,
races, creeds and colors." Id.
100. See Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (Johnson, J.,
dissenting) (stating it is not possible to determine effect on jury).
101. 157 Tex. Crim. 200, 248 S.W.2d 147 (1952).
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where a prosecutor argued that defense witnesses of the same race as the
defendant would be unbelievable.' 02 In Allison, the defendant, an Afri-
can American, was prosecuted for the rape of a white woman. 103 Mr.
Allison presented several witnesses to testify regarding his alibi. The
prosecutor asked three of the witnesses if they were of the same race as
the defendant, which they were.' 04 In his argument to the jury, the prose-
cutor stated he was not criticizing Mr. Allison for presenting witnesses of
the same race as him, but he just wanted the jury to "know for the pur-
pose of the record they try to help their own race."' 5 Although the de-
fense attorney objected, 106 the trial judge refused to instruct the jury to
disregard the prosecutor's statement. 10 7 The appellate court found the
prosecutor's argument objectionable and reversed the conviction. 10 8 In
support of its reasoning, the court stated the prosecution "sought to con-
demn as a class all testimony coming from members of the colored
race."'0 9 This is precisely what the State of Texas did in Mr. Saldano's
case when it presented testimony that Hispanics are more dangerous to
society. It was not merely a remark which appealed to racial prejudice,
but the actual introduction of race as a valid reason to sentence an indi-
vidual to death.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 148.
105. Id. at 147.
106. The defense attorney stated that the argument was not supported by the record,
constituted unsworn testimony of the district attorney, and was an appeal to racial
prejudice." Id.
107. Id. at 148.
108. In support of its holding, the Court of Criminal Appeals detailed objectionable
statements from other jurisdictions in which the prosecutor alleged members of certain
races or classes were unbelievable. Id. The Texas court cited a case from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit wherein it reversed a conviction based on the pros-
ecutor's statement "that he did not care how many Jews the defendant brought here to
testify .... Skuy v. United States, 261 F. 316, 320 (10th Cir. 1919). The Texas Court also
cited with approval a case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
which the prosecutor stated, "These men are Italians .... It is a matter of everyday
knowledge that the majority of people in King County running stills are of the same na-
tionality .... ." Fontanello v. United States, 19 F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1927). In addition, it is
important to note that appeals to racial prejudice are not solely the tactic of the prosecu-
tion. For an example of the infusion of race into trial by the defense, see York v. State, 57
Tex. Crim. 484, 123 S.W. 1112 (1909).
109. Allison, 248 S.W.2d at 148.
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2. The Treatment of the Use of Race at Trial by the Civil Courts of
Appeal in Texas
The civil appellate courts in Texas have long recognized that the appeal
to racial prejudice by either party should not be allowed at trial.' 10 Un-
like the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the Texas civil appellate courts,
including the Supreme Court of Texas, have recognized that appeals to
racial prejudice constitute reversible error even if no objection is made at
trial."'
As early as 1889, the Supreme Court of Texas recognized that appeals
to racial prejudice should not be tolerated at trial.112 In the closing argu-
ment of Moss v. Sanger, the attorney for the Sangers referred to the fact
that Moss, his family, and his business associates were Jewish, stating:
This entire business is a concocted scheme from beginning to end; a
deliberate scheme to swindle and defraud, gotten up by a Jew, a
Dutchman, and a lawyer. Who are the parties at interest? A. Moss;
his wife, Rose Moss; his mother Mary Moss; his clerk, D. Golden;
and then, B. Freiberg, the old he-Jew of all, who, no doubt planned
the whole thing. All Jews, or Dutch Jews, and that is worse. Will an
honest jury of Ellis county let these people, (pointing at A. Moss,
Golden, and Raphael,) whose every thought is how to cheat and
swindle, perpetrate this infamous and outrageous fraud?"'
The jury rendered a general verdict in favor of Sanger." 4 The Texas
Supreme Court reversed the judgment, reasoning that the jury may have
been influenced by the argument and that counsel for Sanger had in-
tended his argument to have an influence, stating "it was the arraignment
of a race not on trial" and stating the trial judge should have punished
Sanger's attorney."' Dr. Quijano's testimony concerning Mr. Saldano's
future dangerousness should be properly recognized as an equally unac-
110. Tex. Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Haywood, 153 Tex. 242, 266 S.W.2d 856 (1954).
111. Tex. Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Guerrero, 800 S.W.2d 859, 863 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1990, writ. denied); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835, 840 (Tex.
1979).
112. Moss v. Sanger, 75 Tex. 321, 12 S.W. 619 (1889).
113. Id.
114. Id
115. The Court, in showing its disapproval of these remarks, made the following
comments:
It was an inflammatory appeal to a prejudice, no doubt, conceived by counsel who
made it to exist, and intended to influence the jury. It was the arraignment of a race
not on trial. Cases ought to be tried in a court of justice upon the facts prove; and
whether a party be a Jewv or gentile, white or black, is a matter of indifference. The
course pursued in this case was one that no court of justice ought for a moment to
tolerate; and it certainly must be true that the judge who tried this cause did not fully
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ceptable arraignment of an entire race and the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals should have told the State the use of such testimony was
improper.
The Supreme Court of Texas, in Texas Employers' Insurance Associa-
tion v. Haywood,116 reiterated that it is a judge's duty to disallow argu-
ments which appeal to racial prejudice during a trial."1 At trial,
Haywood's counsel, in an attempt to belittle the testimony of two Afri-
can-American witnesses, stated that he "wouldn't fly a couple of those
yellow nigs in here and expect the jury to believe that kind of stuff."118 The
court countered:
A jury of white men cannot be called on to determine the credibility
of witnesses on the theory that the Caucasian race has a monopoly
on the virtues of truth and veracity and people of other races, by
virtue of their color, are inbred with dishonesty and perjury without
implanting in the minds of the jurors the deepest and most eradica-
ble type of prejudice.11 9
The court also indicated that because a curative instruction could not
erase the injection of prejudice, no objection was necessary to preserve
error for appellate review.12 0 The court emphasized lawyers' ethical obli-
gations to refrain from interjecting race into a trial and also emphasized
the trial judge's duty to correct a lawyer when such a transgression oc-
understand the language of counsel, or he would not have permitted it,- would have
rebuked it, and ought to have punished its author.
Md.
116. 153 Tex. 242, 266 S.W. 2d 856 (1954).
117. Tex. Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Haywood, 153 Tex. 242,266 S.W.2d 856,859 (1954).
Haywood was suing for workmen's compensation for a neck injury. Id. at 857.
118. Id. (emphasis in original). The insurance company called two African-American
witnesses to testify in rebuttal of Haywood's testimony. Id. During closing argument,
Haywood's counsel implied that the two witnesses were unbelievable because they were
African Americans, stating that the insurance company should have called white witnesses
so the jury would know that they were telling the truth. Id. at 858.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 858. The Supreme Court of Texas stated that the test to be applied in
determining whether a case should be reversed because of improper jury argument is:
[W]hether the argument, considered in its proper setting, was reasonably calculated to
cause such prejudice to the opposing litigant that a withdrawal by counsel or an in-
struction by the court, or both, could not eliminate the probability that it resulted in
an improper verdict.
Id. The court based this test on Rules 434 and 503 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
which were then in effect. Id. It appears that because of these rules the Supreme Court
was moving away from an automatic reversal for cases in which the jury argument ap-
pealed to race prejudice and would require some showing that an improper verdict was the
result of the prejudicial jury argument before reversible error would be found.
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curs.121 These duties to ensure a trial free from the taint of racist remarks
are not addressed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Saldano II.
The appellate court case of Texas Employers' Insurance Association v.
Guerrero 2 is of the utmost significance because the San Antonio Court
of Appeals acknowledged that it is a judge's duty to ensure a trial is free
from racial prejudice.123 The record revealed that, along with Guerrero,
his attorney, and his treating doctor, eleven of the jurors had Spanish
surnames.1 24 During closing argument, Guerrero's attorney quoted from
a well-known author, 5 stating, "Things that unite us far exceed those
things that divide us."' 26 He further stated, "There is a time to be united.
Right now is a time to be united ... But by golly there comes a time when
we have got to stick together as a community."127 The insurance com-
pany's attorney made an incomplete objection and no ruling was ob-
tained from the trial court."2 On appeal, the San Antonio court
discussed at length whether or not an objection was necessary in order for
the case to be reversed on this point and decided no objection was neces-
sary. The court based its reasoning on the Supreme Court of Texas' opin-
ion in Standard Fire Insurance Company v. Reese' 29 that jury arguments
appealing to racial prejudice are an exception to the rule requiring an
objection because such arguments are by their very nature incurable.'
The court further stated that the determination of harmfulness of the
argument did not turn on whether it was an explicit or subtle appeal to
ethnic unity, as the mere appeal to race or ethnicity is forbidden.' Ad-
ditionally, a jury must not be allowed to reward or penalize a party on
such a basis. 3 2 Based on this reasoning and the long history in Texas civil
121. Id at 859-60.
122. 800 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied). Guerrero was su-
ing for worker's compensation benefits for an injury he received when he fell from a farm
tractor. Id.
123. Id at 867-68. The opinion quoted the rule requiring judges to police jury argu-
ment. Id at 867 (quoting Rule 269 of the Texas Rules of Civil of Procedure). Ibis rule
has not changed since its adoption in 1892. See id. It is still the rule today. See Tx. R.
Crv. P. 269(g) (stating "court will not be required to wait for objections to be made when
the rules as to arguments are violated ...
124. Guerrero, 800 S.W.2d at 862.
125. The author's name was Octavio Paz. Id.
126. Id (emphasis deleted).
127. Id. (emphasis deleted).
128. Id at 865 n.6. The insurance company's attorney stated, "Your Honor, this is
getting a little inflammatory in asking the jury to take that position" and was then inter-
rupted. Id. at 862.
129. 584 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. 1979).
130. Guerrero, 800 S.W.2d at 863.
131. Id at 865.
132. Id
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cases condemning appeals to racial prejudice, 33 the court held the re-
marks by counsel urging ethnic unity was reversible error.134
Guerrero provides a significant example of civil courts' recognition that
the interjection of race into a trial results in incurable harm subjecting the
case to automatic reversal even if no objection is made. This provides a
stark contrast to Saldano II, where the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
held an objection necessary to preserve error when race is interjected into
trial. Guerrero is also significant in that it distinguishes between types of
improper jury argument which require an objection and arguments ap-
pealing to racial prejudice that do not require an objection to preserve
the error for appellate review. 135 The Guerrero court understood the dis-
tinction between jury arguments that appeal to racism and cause incur-
able harm and those which do not. The court in Saldano II failed to
recognize the distinction between evidentiary matters that invite and
even condone racism and those evidentiary matters that do not relate to
race. Under the holding of Saldano II, it appears that defendants in civil
disputes over money have more protection from racially tainted proceed-
ings than do criminal defendants in death penalty cases.
133. See id. at 866 n.7 (listing cases condemning the use of race, ethnicity, national
origin and religion in jury arguments).
134. Id. at 866-67. A dissent was filed in Guerrero arguing that subtle references to
race in closing argument should be analyzed for their harmful effect. Guerrero, 800 SW.2d
at 869 (Biery, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that although an incurable jury argument
need not be objected to in order to preserve the error for appellate review, the jury argu-
ment must be reviewed for its harmful effect to determine whether it is reversible error or
not. Id. at 870. Relying on Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 81(b)(1), which requires
the appellate court to find the error which caused the rendition of an incorrect verdict
before it can reverse the trial court, the dissent criticized the majority for using an auto-
matic reversal rule for subtle arguments appealing to ethnic unity. See id. This was the
rule in effect at the time. See TEx. R. App. P. 81 (b)(1). Rule 81 dealt with the conditions
under which the courts of appeal may reverse a trial court. Id. Specifically, Rule 81(b)(1)
stated that "No judgment shall be reversed on appeal ... unless the appellate court shall be
of the opinion that the error complained of amounted to such a denial of the rights of the
appellant as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause rendition of an
improper judgment in the case . T..." rEx. R. App. P. 81 (b)(1). Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 44.1, which replaces Rule 81 (b)(1), does not contain the words "reasonably
calculated to cause." See TEx. R. App. P. 44.1. However, the commentary to the rule
states that the omission of the phrase "reasonably calculated to cause" did not create a
substantive change from the old rule. TEx. R. App. P. 44 comment; Guerrero, 800 S.W.2d
at 870 (Biery, J. Dissenting). The dissent discussed cases in which a harmless analysis was
performed in determining whether a jury argument complained about should cause a re-
versal of the case. See id. at 869-70. The dissent opined that the subtle jury argument in
this case was not improper and much less harmful. Id. at 871.
135. Id. at 863.
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B. Cases from Other Jurisdictions Concerning the Use of Race at Trial
1. Cases from Other States Concerning the Use of Race at Trial
A short review of cases from other states concerning the issue of the
use of race or ethnicity at trial is illustrative of the almost universal con-
demnation of the use of race in trials.'3 6
In the New York State case of People v. Thomas, 37 the defendant, a
black male, was charged with criminal possession of a weapon.' 38 The
defendant was walking in a predominantly Hispanic and African-Ameri-
can neighborhood when three white policemen confronted him.139 The
defendant reached for a gun, which was in the waistband of his pants.140
The defendant testified that he had only temporarily and innocently pos-
sessed the gun, which he had just found in a nearby playground.' 4 ' He
stated that when three men approached him he believed they were mug-
gers, not plainclothes policemen.1 4
2
The prosecutor, in an attempt to discredit the defendant's testimony
that he thought they could be muggers, repeatedly referred to the race of
the policemen in her cross-examination of the defendant.'43 Addition-
ally, in closing argument the prosecutor stated:
I would submit to you that if three white males jumped out of a
green Plymouth Volarie [sic] in this neighborhood and ran up to you,
you just might tend to think these are not muggers, these could be
police officers. 144
The defense made no objection to the questions nor to the jury argu-
ment. 45 The New York court stated that the apparent theme of the pros-
ecutor's questions and jury argument concerning the police officers' race
was "that a black man in a black neighborhood cannot conceivably be the
136. For a comprehensive review of the treatment of prosecutors' appeals to prejudice
in criminal trials, see Landis, supra note 65 (listing cases and treatment by courts).
137. 514 N.Y.S.2d 91 (App. Div. 1987).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 92.
140. Id
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. The prosecutor made the following reference in her questioning of the defen-
dant: "When you saw two white guys with badges hanging around their necks jump out of
an unmarked car, is it your testimony that you thought they were muggers?"; "[What did
you do when] you saw these two white police officers jump out of an unmarked car[?]";
"Has it happened before that three white guys in an unmarked police car pulled up to you
and jumped out and jumped you and knocked you down to the ground[?]"; and, "Is it your
testimony that you have been mugged by three white guys in this neighborhood?" Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 93.
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victim of a crime committed by a white man.' 1 46 The court reversed the
conviction, reiterating what it had said years earlier:
[t]he vice of such an argument is not only that it is predicated on a
false and illogical premise, but more important it is divisive: it seeks
to separate the racial origin of witnesses in the minds of the jury, and
to encourage the weighing of [evidence] on the basis of racial similar-
ity or dissimilarity of the witnesses. The argument offends the demo-
cratic and logical principle that race, creed or nationality, in
themselves, provide no reasoning for believing or disbelieving a wit-
ness' testimony.147
The court reversed the case "in the interest of justice" even though no
objection was made at trial. 48 Unlike the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals, the Thomas court recognized the fundamental nature of the right
to have a trial free from prejudice and innuendo that divides people along
racial lines.
The Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth v. Tirado149 provides another
example of the condemnation of the use of race at trial. In Tirado, the
Puerto Rican defendant was convicted of murder.150 Mr. Mirado claimed
he shot the victim in self-defense.' 5 ' The prosecution called a police of-
ficer of Puerto Rican origin to testify regarding the customs of Puerto
Ricans, specifically the character trait of "machismo," which was suppos-
edly a trait peculiar to Puerto Rican males.' 5 ' When the defendant's at-
torney requested an offer of proof, the prosecutor stated that his theory
of the case required him to show the defendant was acting out of a sense
of "machismo" and a need to "save face."' 5 3 Despite the obvious race
implications, the trial court allowed the testimony. 54 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reversed in recognition of the fact that the testimony vio-
146. Id.
147. Id. (quoting People v. Hearns, 238 N.Y.S. 2d 173, 174 (App. Div. 1963).
148. Id at 93.
149. 375 A.2d 336 (Pa. 1977).
150. Id at 337.
151. Id. The prosecutor alleged the defendant had approached the deceased and his
brother-in-law in a restaurant and asked the deceased to step outside. Id. The defendant
testified that the deceased had come looking for him. He further testified that the night
before the deceased had demanded the defendant give him a watch, gold chain and money,
which the defendant refused to do. The defendant also testified that the deceased had
vowed to "get him no matter what." Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 337-38. The prosecutor sought to show, by virtue of this alleged "mach-
ismo" character trait of Puerto Rican males, that the victim had refused to back down
when the defendant displayed it and that the defendant had intended "... to shame the
victim into backing down ..... Id.
154. Id
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lated the defendant's right to a fair trial. The court noted that at issue
should be the individual motivations of the defendant and the deceased,
not the alleged general motivations of Puerto Rican males. 55 In revers-
ing the case, the court stated that:
[a]bove all else people are individuals, and in a criminal prosecution
we are concerned with what each individual did and why it was done
in a particular situation. What other individuals of the same ethnic,
racial, or religious background might have done in a similar situation
is irrelevant. The introduction of this irrelevant material prejudiced
appellant by casting him in the eyes of the jury as a member of a
group with values allegedly alien to the rest of society, and therefore
implying that it was more likely that he committed the crime
charged.15
6
It appears the Tirado Court would recognize precisely the ills caused by
the type of testimony elicited from Dr. Quijano in Mr. Saldano's case: It
is simply irrelevant that there are more Hispanics in prison than in the
general population. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has failed to
recognize that the perceived characteristics a group of people may share
should be irrelevant when the State is seeking to punish an individual
Such stereotyping has also been condemned in Florida. In Terrazas v.
State,157 a Mexican American was tried for murder. 5 ' The State em-
ployed a revenge-killing theory, based on an alleged statement by Ter-
razas that he knew the deceased had previously robbed his family's
home. 59 Based on this statement, the prosecutor offered the following in
his opening argument:
This is the United States, vigilante style justice will not be tolerated.
And while you will hear that a lot of people involved in this case
have a Mexico (sic) ethnic background, any style of justice common
to those people, Mexican people and in Mexico, is not how the law
works. 6o
The defense attorney immediately objected and subsequently moved
for a mistrial, which was denied. 61 The appellate court reversed the case
"because attempts to attribute criminal conduct to a defendant based on
racial or ethnic background have been universally condemned by the
155. Id.
156. Id. (citing United States ex rel. Haynes v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d 152 (2nd Cir.
1973)).
157. 696 So.2d 1309 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. 1997).
158. Terrazas v. State, 696 So.2d 1309, 1309 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. 1997).
159. Id
160. Id. at 1310.
161. Id
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courts of [Florida]."' 6 2 Although the court noted that such tactics consti-
tute fundamental error, as evidenced by cases previously decided, in this
instance they declined to reach the question since an objection and mo-
tion for mistrial had been made.163
The Terrazas court recognized, just as the Tirado court did, that it is
impermissible to assign perceived characteristics of an ethnic group to
any individual member of that group. Further, the Terrazas Court noted
that even in the absence of an objection, the conviction would still have
been reversed. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals failed to see it is
impermissible to punish a defendant because he is a member of a certain
race, and that an objection should not be necessary, especially in death
penalty proceedings.
However, a Nevada Supreme Court decision recognizes that the Eighth
Amendment in death penalty proceedings requires a defendant receive a
trial free from all racially prejudicial taint."64 In Dawson v. State,165 the
defendant, an African American, was charged with the murder, kidnap-
162. Id. (citing Perez v. State, 689 So.2d 306 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 1997)); Reynolds v.
State, 580 So.2d 254 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1991); George v. State, 539 So.2d 21 (Fla. App. 5.
Dist. 1989); Salazar-Rodriguez v. State, 436 So. 2d 269 (Fla. App. 3. Dist. 1983)).
163. Id. The Terrazas court cited Perez v. State, 689 So.2d 306 (Fla. App.3 Dist. 1997),
and Reynolds v. State, 580 So.2d 254 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1991) which both found fundamen-
tal error when the prosecution attempted to attribute the alleged traits of others to the
defendants. In Perez, the defendant was charged with aggravated assault of a corrections
officer as the result of a prison melee. See Perez, 689 So.2d at 306. No evidence was
presented that the prison melee was based on any racial factors. Id. Nonetheless, the
prosecutor argued that the defendant was involved in " . . . a war that's divided along
racial lines." Id. at 307. The Florida court reversed the case despite the lack of an objec-
tion by the defense attorney. Id. at 308. In Reynolds, the defendant, a black man, was
convicted of sexual battery of a white woman. Reynolds, 580 So.2d at 255. Reynolds'
defense was consent. Id. The prosecutor made repeated references, from voir dire to clos-
ing argument, to both Reynolds' and the complainant's race and implied that a white wo-
man would never consent to sexual relations with a black man. Id. at 255-56. No
objections were made. Id. However, the Court found these statements to be fundamental
error, based on case law from various jurisdictions finding similar conduct on the part of
the prosecution to be fundamental error. Id. at 256-57. See also Miller v. State of North
Carolina, 583 F.2d 701, 703-704 (4th Cir. 1978) (finding fundamental error where no objec-
tion lodged to improper jury argument); United States ex. rel. Haynes v. McKendrick, 350
F.Supp. 990, 998-1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd, 481 F.2d 152 (2nd Cir. 1973) (finding funda-
mental error where no objection lodged to improper jury argument); Kelly v. Stone, 514
F.2d 18, 19 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding fundamental error where no objection lodged to im-
proper jury argument).
164. Dawson v. State, 734 P.2d 221, 222 (Nev. 1987). In so doing, the Court relied on
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence which requires a unique and individualized determina-
tion of the punishment that a particular defendant deserves. Id. (citing Turner v. Murray,
476 U.S. 28 (1986) and Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 340 n.7 (1985)).
165. Id.
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ping and rape ot a white woman. 66 During the guilt or innocence phase
of the trial, evidence was admitted that the defendant had previously had
a relationship with a white female.167 In closing argument during the
punishment phase, the prosecutor reiterated that the defendant had a
"preference for white women." 6 The court recognized there was no le-
gitimate purpose for referring to the defendant's sexual preference in the
punishment phase of the trial, where it is determined whether the defen-
dant will live or die. 1'6 9 The court held the prosecutor's argument was
unfairly prejudicial and reversed.'70 The Nevada Court overturned Diw-
son's death sentence, but let stand the conviction, reasoning that
[b]ecause of the delicate task which the trier of fact has in weighing
the mitigating circumstances against the aggravating circumstances,
the kind and level of prejudice which might not require reversal of a con-
viction may be sufficient to require reversal of a death penalty.171
Unlike the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the Nevada court recog-
nized that death penalty punishment proceedings are distinct from any
other type of criminal trial proceeding. The Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals in Saldano II failed to understand that difference when it held an
objection to Dr. Quijano's race-based testimony was required to preserve
the issue for appellate review. The court in Saldano II failed to recognize
that allowing the jury's decision to be influenced by the introduction of
Dr. Quijano's inflammatory race-based evidence constituted fundamental
error. This ruling essentially equated the failure to object to the race-
based evidence with the failure to object to any other type of inadmissible
evidence which is unacceptable, particularly when it is applied to death
penalty punishment proceedings.
2. The Federal Statute and Cases Concerning the Use of Race in
Death Penalty Proceedings
Like state courts outside of Texas, federal courts condemn the use of
racial remarks and purported evidence that a defendant shares certain
alleged characteristics of a specific ethnic group of which he is a member.
Significantly, the Congress of the United States has enacted a law prohib-
iting the use of race in death penalty proceedings. The Federal Death
Penalty Act of 1994172 prohibits the jury's consideration of both the de-
166. Id. at 221-22.
167. Id at 222.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id
171. Id. at 224.
172. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3598.
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fendant's and victim's race or national origin as either an aggravating or
mitigating factor in determining whether the defendant should be sen-
tenced to death. 73
In a case construing this federal statute, United States v. Webster, 74 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Federal
Death Penalty Act of 1994 was not unconstitutional for prohibiting the
use of a person's race as either a mitigating or aggravating factor.' 75 The
Fifth Circuit based this holding on the Equal Protection 17 6 and Due Pro-
cess1 77 clauses contained in the Bill of Rights.' 78 The court opined that
criminal trials constitute state action and, therefore, the action of the gov-
ernment in those trials is subject to strict scrutiny when the government
uses race in its decision making.' 79 The court stated that the government
cannot ever meet the compelling government interest prong of the strict
scrutiny test when race is a factor in capital sentencing considerations. s0
The court went further, stating that "the use of race in sentencing deter-
minations is particularly invidious. 'Discrimination on the basis of race,
odious in all aspects, is especially pernicious in the administration of jus-
tice."""' The court spoke specifically to the use of race in death penalty
cases, declaring it particularly offensive to the Constitution and quoting
Justice Brennan's dissent in McClesky v. Kemp:'82
173. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(f). Section 3593(f) provides the following:
Special precaution to ensure against discrimination. -In a hearing held before a jury,
the court, prior to the return of a finding under subsection (e), shall instruct the jury
that, in considering whether a sentence of death is justified, it shall not consider the
race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant or of any victim
and that the jury is not to recommend a sentence of death unless it has concluded that
it would recommend a sentence of death for the crime in question no matter what the
race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant or of any victim
may be. The jury, upon return of a finding under subsection (e), shall also return to
the court a certificate, signed by each juror, that consideration of race, color, religious
beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant or any victim was not involved in
reaching his or her individual decision and that the individual juror would have made
the same recommendation regarding a sentence for the crime in question no matter
what the race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant or any
victims may be.
ld.
174. 162 F.3d 308 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 528 U.S. 829 (1999).
175. Id. at 355.
176. U.S. CONsT. amend XIV.
177. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
178. Webster, 162 F.3d at 355.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 356 (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979)).
182. 481 U.S. 270 (1987).
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Considering the race of a defendant or victim in deciding if the death
penalty should be imposed is completely at odds with th[e] concern
that an individual be evaluated as a unique human being. Decisions
influenced by race rest in part on a categorical assessment of the
worth of human beings according to color, insensitive to whatever
qualities the individuals in question may possess.183
The court pointed out that "a long line of Supreme Court precedent
admonishes that the guillotine must be as color-blind as is theConstitution. " "s
Although the Webster court did not hold that all alleged errors under
the statute would be reviewed regardless of whether an objection was
lodged,"85 the United States Supreme Court has stated that even errors
not objected to will be reviewed under a plain error standard required by
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b).11 Under the plain error stan-
dard of review, a federal death sentence will not be reversed "unless
there has been (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) affects substantial
rights."' Further, even if the alleged error satisfies these three prongs,
the appellate court should only correct the error "if it 'seriously affect[s]
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.! ' l"sS
Attorney General John Cornyn recognized that the introduction of
race in Mr. Saldano's case met the federal plain error standard, stating in
his response to Mr. Saldano's petition for writ of certiorari that "the use
of race in Saldano's sentencing seriously undermined the fairness, integ-
rity, or public reputation of the judicial process . . . ."9 Although the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recognized in Saldano II that there are
certain errors that can be reviewed despite the lack of an objection,'9
and even cited to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b),' 91 the court
183. Id at 336 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Webster, 162 F.3d at 356 (quoting McCleskey,
481 U.S. at 336 (Brennan J. dissenting)).
184. Webster, 162 F.3d at 356 (citing McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292-93, Zant v. Stephens,
462 U.S. 862 (1983) and Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979)).
185. Section 3595(c)(2)(A) requires an appellate court to review death sentences to
determine whether the sentence "was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or
any other factor." 18 U.S.C. § 3595 (c)(2)(A).
186. Jones v. United States, 427 U.S. 373, 389 (1999); FED. R. Cus. P. 52(b). Rule
52(b) states that "[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed al-
though they were not brought to the attention of the court." Id.
187. Jones, 527 U.S. at 389 (citing Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997)
and United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)).
188. Id., (citing Olano, 520 U.S. at 467) (alterations in original).
189. Response to Petition for Writ of Certioriari at 7, Saldano v. Texas, 530 U.S. 1212
(2000) (No. 99-8119) (on file with author).
190. Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 887-89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
191. Id at 887 n-58.
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held that the use of race as a factor to weigh in determining whether Mr.
Saldano should live or die was not such an error. In fact, the court wholly
failed to mention or cite to the Texas counterpart to Rule 52(b)-Texas
Rule of Evidence 103(d). Rule 103(d) provides that appellate courts may
"tak[e] notice of fundamental errors affecting substantial rights although
they were not brought to the attention of the court."19 Notably, in
Saldano I, the Court of Criminal Appeals did mention Mr. Saldano's
claim that it was fundamental error under Rule 103(d), although the
court provided no analysis explaining why this was not such an error.193
Since it appears Mr. Saldano will not be granted relief in Texas courts, he
will have to rely on the federal courts. The federal courts, in construing
state-imposed death sentences, have condemned the use of race or
ethnicity in death penalty trials.
For example, in Bains v. Cambra,194 the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals granted a petitioner's writ of habeas corpus for a California murder
conviction. 95 The defendant, Bains, an adherent of the Sikh faith, was
charged with the capital murder of his sister's husband, after leaving her
after two years of marriage. At trial the prosecution presented evidence
to allege that adherents of the Sikh faith will murder the husband of a
family member if that husband divorces his wife, in an attempt to seek
revenge and "save face."'19 6 During closing argument, the prosecutor re-
lied heavily on the testimony presented regarding the Sikh religion, "in-
vit[ing] the jury to give in to their prejudices and to buy into various
stereotypes.' ' 197 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that under
federal law, the prosecutor's argument was a clear violation of the right to
equal protection and due process.' 98 Upon review of the lower court's
application of harmless error analysis, the appellate court found that
192. TEx. R. EvID. 103(d).
193. Saldano v.' State, No. 72,556, slip op. at 9 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 1999), va-
cated by 530 U.S. 1212 (2000).
194. 204 F. 3d 964 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1035 (2000).
195. Id. at 983.
196. Id. at 970. This evidence was admissible during the guilt or innocence phase of
the trial for the purpose of showing motive or intent. Id. at 974.
197. Id. at 974. The prosecutor stated in closing argument: "If you do certain conduct
with respect to a Sikh person's female family member, look out. You can expect violence."
Id. at 975. He also stated that Sikhs are "unable to assimilate to and to abide by the laws of
the United States." Id. The prosecutor also asked a sheriff's department employee who
was testifying as an expert on Sikh religion and culture whether Sikh's had a greater poten-
tial for violence under certain circumstances. Id. at 980-81 (Canby, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 974 (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 270, 309 n.30 (1987); Kelly v,
Stone, 514 F.2d 18, 19 (9th Cir. 1975); Fontanello v. United States, 19 F.2d 921, 921-22 (9th
Cir. 1927); United States v. Vue, 13 F.3d 1206, 1212-13 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Doe, 903 F.2d 16, 21-29 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States ex rel. Haynes v. IvMcKendrick, 481
F.2d 152, 156-61 (2d Cir. 1973)).
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there was sufficient evidence of Bains' guilt so that there were no "'grave
doubt[s]' about whether the errors here had 'a substantial and injurious
effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'"' Although the
Bains Court did not reverse the case, it did condemn the prosecutor's
statements, pointing out that the prosecutor's arguments were stereotypi-
cal of a particular group.200 In a striking contrast to the Bains court, a
majority of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Saldano II did not
even voice displeasure with the State's use of Dr. Quijano's testimony,
much less condemn the use of such testimony.
Similarly, in a case before the Federal District Court sitting in Houston,
Texas, Guerra v. Collins,"0 the interjection of race into a case was con-
demned, and the defendant's writ of habeas corpus petition granted,
based on the cumulative effect of prosecutorial misconduct.F° During
voir dire the prosecutor informed jurors that the fact that Guerra was an
illegal alien should be considered in determining whether Guerra should
be sentenced to death.20 3 The court held death penalty defendants are
entitled to be judged on their own individual characteristics and not those
alleged to be shared by a group of peopleYX The court further stated
that statements as to race in jury argument were constitutionally imper-
missible because they appealed to prejudice based on ethnicity or na-
tional origin.20
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Saldano II has ignored the
impropriety of allowing the jury's decision to sentence Mr. Saldano to
death to be influenced by the perceived dangerousness of Hispanics as a
class. Although the federal courts and statutes provide that a person's
race or ethnicity is irrelevant in death penalty proceedings, Texas' highest
criminal court, in upholding Mr. Saldano's death sentence, has allowed
race to be a relevant factor. Additionally, despite the federal courts' rec-
ognition that review of errors not objected to regarding the introduction
of race into death penalty punishment proceedings is necessary, the Texas
court has refused to examine the error under any standard of review.
199. Id at 977-78 (applying harmless error analysis standard set forth in Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 636-38 (1993)).
200. Id at 975.
201. 916 F.Supp. 620 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
202. Id at 637. The federal court held it was not barred from addressing the issue
since the State court "found no waiver of error." Id.
203. Id at 636.
204. Id. (citing Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878-79 (1983)). Additionally, the court
found the statements improper since there was no evidence that illegal aliens are predis-
posed to commit future criminal acts. Id. at 636.
205. Id.
2002]
THE SCHOLAR
C. United States Supreme Court Cases Concerning Race
Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the. Constitution,
the United States Supreme Court has consistently condemned racial dis-
crimination in the criminal justice system.206 In the criminal arena, the
United States Supreme Court has held that jurors may not be excluded
from jury service based on their race,2 °7 and that a prosecutor may not
base his charging decision on race.208
The Supreme Court has engaged in "unceasing efforts to eradicate ra-
cial discrimination"209 in the criminal justice system since its 1879 deci-
sion of Strauder v. West Virginia.21° In Strauder, the Court held a state
law unconstitutional where the law provided that only white men could
be jurors.211 The Court ruled that the statute violated the 'Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the purpose of which is the
"protection of life and liberty against race or color prejudice. 2 12
Since Strauder, the Court has ruled that racial discrimination has no
part in the selection of jurors213 or grand jurors.214 In one such grand
jury discrimination case, Rose v. Mitchell,2" 5 the United States Supreme
Court held that a defendant's right to equal protection of the law is vio-
lated when a state racially discriminates in the selection of the grand jury
206. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 n.30 (1987) (listing cases forbidding
the use of race in criminal justice system).
207. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1969); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S, 202, (1965);
see, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 84 n.3 (listing cases holding equal protection violated when
state deliberately denies juror participation based on race).
208. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986); see, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303 (1880); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 396 (1881); Bush v, Kentucky, 107 U.S.
110 (1883); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900);
Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); Smith v.
Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282
(1950); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955);
Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Arnold v. North Carolina, 367 U.S. 773 (1964);
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977);
Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979); see also Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 493 n.12 (listing cases
where grand jury selection procedure held unconstitutional by Supreme Court).
209. Batson, 476 U.S. at 84.
210. Strauder, 100 U.S. 303.
211. Id. at 305.
212. Id. at 309.
213. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. 79; Swain, 380 U.S. 202.
214. See, e.g. Neal, 103 U.S. at 396; Bush 107 U.S. 110; Gibson, 162 U.S. 565; Carter,
177 U.S. 442; Rogers, 192 U.S. 226; Pierre, 306 U.S. 354; Smith, 311 U.S. 128; Hill, 316 U.S.
400; Cassell, 339 U.S. 282; Hernandez, 347 U.S. 475; Reece, 350 U.S. 85; Eubanks, 356 U.S.
584; Arnold, 376 U.S. 773; Alexander, 405 U.S. 625; Castaneda, 430 U.S. 482; Mitchell, 443
U.S. 545; Vasquez, 474 U.S. 254.
215. 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
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which indicts the defendant.216 In Mitchell, the African-American de-
fendants complained that the State of Tennessee had violated their equal
protection rights by racially discriminating in the selection of the foreman
of the grand jury.217 Prior to reaching the question of whether Mitchell
had proved his claim, the Supreme Court addressed whether a state court
defendant should be allowed to challenge, on federal habeas review, the
racial make-up of the grand jury that indicts him when he had been found
guilty by a petit jury in a constitutionally fair trial?" In deciding that
state defendants should still be allowed to complain about a racially dis-
criminatory make-up, the Court stated that the societal costs enunciated
by the dissent2 19 "are outweighed by the strong policy the Court consist-
ently has recognized of combating racial discrimination in the administra-
tion of justice."'  The majority reasoned that
[d]iscrimination on the basis of race, odious in all aspects, is espe-
cially pernicious in the administration of justice. Selection of mem-
bers of a grand jury because they are of one race and not another
destroys the appearance of justice and thereby casts doubt on the
integrity of the judicial process. The exclusion from grand jury ser-
vice of Negroes, or any group otherwise qualified to serve, impairs
the confidence of the public in the administration of justice. As this
Court repeatedly has emphasized, such discrimination 'not only vio-
lates our Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war
with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative
government.' The harm is not only to the accused, indicted as he is
by a jury from which a segment of the community has been excluded.
It is to society as a whole. 'The injury is not limited to the defendant-
there is injury to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the
community at large, and the democratic ideal reflected in the process
of our courts.''2 1
The majority further recognized that racial discrimination still occurs in
the criminal justice system, albeit in more subtle forms, yet "it is not less
real or pernicious."'  Based on this reasoning the majority of the Mitch-
ell court refused to overturn its prior holdings requiring reversal when a
216. Id at 559.
217. Id at 548.
218. Id. at 587. Basically the Court considered the question whether a defendant's
constitutionally valid conviction by a petit jury should render moot his claims regarding the
unconstitutional make-up of the grand jury. Id. at 582.
219. See hi at 578 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating there is "heavy societal cost en-
tailed when valid criminal convictions are overturned").
220. Id at 558.
221. Id at 555-56 (citations omitted).
222. Id. at 559.
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defendant had shown racial discrimination in the selection of the grand
jury that indicted him.2 3
In Mitchell, the Supreme Court recognized that there are some rights
that are so fundamental as to justify vacating validly obtained convictions
and that one of those rights is the right to have a trial free from racism.
The Court also recognized that there are forms of racism that are subtle,
yet remain highly injurious to society as a whole. The use by the State of
Texas of Dr. Quijano's testimony stating that Hispanics are to be consid-
ered more dangerous because more Hispanics are in prison than in the
general population appears to be such a form of racism. The Texas Court
223. Id. The Court then turned to the facts of Mitchell's case and found that Mitchell
had presented insufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the
selection of forepersons, despite the State's concession that Mitchell had presented suffi.
cient proof. Id. at 573. Mitchell illustrates that since the Supreme Court's opinion in
Strauder, there has never been a question as to its enunciated principles that racial discrim-
ination in the selection of jurors or grand jurors violates the Equal Protection Clause;
rather, in the cases after Strauder the Court has been concerned with the question of
whether the petitioner has carried the evidentiary burden necessary to prove purposeful
discrimination by the State. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89-90 (listing cases). One such case in
which the Supreme Court again faced the issue of the evidentiary burden that must be
borne by a defendant in a criminal case in alleging racial discrimination is McCleskey. See,
e.g. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). The defendant in McCleskey, a black man,
argued that racial considerations entered into the determination of his death sentence be-
cause the victim was a white man. Id. at 282-83. Specifically, McCleskey argued that
Georgia's capital sentencing process violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments be-
cause it is administered in a discriminatory manner based on race. Id. at 286. To prove this
claim, McCleskey introduced a statistical study which allowed that black men were several
more times as likely to receive the death penalty when the victim was white. Id. The
Supreme Court, without disputing the statistics contained in the study, held that the defen-
dant was required to show that the decision-makers in his individual case acted with a
discriminatory purpose and the statistics McCleskey presented did not show this. Id. at
297. The Court reasoned that under equal protection analysis, McCleskey must show pur-
poseful discrimination by the State which has a discriminatory effect on him. Id. at 293.
Further, the Court stated, because each jury is unique, a general statistical pattern cannot
be used to show discrimination in a specific case. Id. at 294. The Supreme Court then
reasoned under Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that Georgia's capital sentencing stat-
utes and process sufficiently narrow the class of individuals who may be subject to the
death penalty and focus the sentencer's discretion on the individual characteristics of the
crime and the defendant. Id. at 304-05. The Court stated the discretion allowed the deci-
sion-maker under Georgia law is guided by objective standards which protect the capital
defendant from discriminatory application. Id. at 303-04. Significant to the Supreme
Court's decision was the Georgia procedure requiring the trial judge to answer a question-
naire about whether racial prejudice influenced the trial and the review by the Georgia
State Supreme Court of each death sentence to see if it was imposed because of an influ-
ence of any racial prejudice. Id. at 303. The Court reasoned that discrepancies are inher-
ent in a judicial system which allows jury discretion to decline to impose a death sentence
and that the constitutional requirements are met when the process has sufficient safeguards
in place to minimize the influence of racial prejudice. Id. at 313.
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of Criminal Appeals has apparently not come to this realization, as evi-
denced by its opinion in Saldano II, in which the Court failed to discuss
the merits of the error of allowing a person's race to be a factor in deter-
mining his future dangerousness and failed even to condemn the use of
such.
Although the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals did not seek to ensure
that racism does not infect trials, the Supreme Court has consistently
sought to ensure that racism, in any form, does not invade the criminal
justice system and capital murder proceedings in particular. For example,
the Supreme Court, in Turner v. Murray,' 4 held that a capital defendant
is entitled to voir dire the jury on racial bias whenever the defendant is
charged with an interracial crime3 s Prior to Turner, the Court held that
the Constitution did not require voir dire questioning into racial prejudice
of potential jurors simply because the defendant and alleged victim were
of different races." 6 Rather, it was held that questioning of jurors re-
garding their personal racial prejudices was not constitutionally required
unless the circumstances and specific facts involved in the charged crime
created a significant probability that racial prejudice might play a part in
the trial3 27 In Tunier, however, the Supreme Court held that in capital
murder prosecutions involving interracial violence the trial judge must
allow questioning into the racial bias of potential jurors if requested by
the defendant' - The Court held that capital cases require a different
rule because the jury is required to make a unique and individualized
determination that a defendant is deserving of death, and "[t]he risk of
racial prejudice infecting a capital sentencing proceeding is especially se-
rious in light of the complete finality of the death sentence." 229 The
Court explained its reasoning, stating that
Because of the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a capital
sentencing hearing, there is a unique opportunity for racial prejudice
to operate but remain undetected. On the facts of this case, a juror
who believes that blacks are violence prone or morally inferior might
well be influenced by that belief in deciding whether petitioner's
crime involved the aggravating factors specified under Virginia law.
Such a juror might also be less favorably inclined toward petitioner's
evidence of mental disturbance as a mitigating circumstance. More
subtle, less consciously held racial attitudes could also influence a
224. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
225. Id. at 36-37.
226. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 597 (1976)
227. Id.
228. Turner, 476 U.S. at 36-37.
229. Id. at 35.
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juror's decision in this case. Fear of blacks, which could easily be
stirred up by the violent facts of petitioner's crime, might incline a
juror to favor the death penalty.230
The Court reiterated that different rules operate in death penalty
cases, recognizing that "the qualitative difference of death from all
other punishments, requires a correspondingly greater degree of
scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination."'"
Despite this United States Supreme Court death penalty jurispru-
dence, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in Saldano II, fails to
give Mr. Saldano's case any great scrutiny nor does it give any expla-
nation as to why it is not an absolute requirement or a non-waiveable
right to have a trial free from testimony stating a defendant's race
may be considered in determining his future dangerousness.232 Fur-
ther, the Court of Criminal Appeals' refusal in Saldano II to recog-
nize that the type of evidence put forth through the testimony of Dr.
Quijano allows what the Supreme Court was worried about in Tur-
ner-that "racial prejudice [will] operate but remain undetected. ''233
Particularly relevant to Saldano II is another grand jury discrimi-
nation case, Castaneda v. Partida,2 4 in which the Supreme Court re-
versed a Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' decision. At trial, Partida
complained that Hidalgo County discriminated against Mexican
Americans in selecting persons to serve on the grand jury.235 As evi-
dence of this discrimination, Partida presented records to the district
court showing that although the county had a Mexican-American
population with Spanish surnames of over 79.1%, only 39% of the
persons serving as grand jurors had Spanish surnames. 236 Although
the State introduced no evidence disputing these numbers, the trial
court overruled Partida's motion for new trial which alleged discrimi-
nation in the selection of the grand jury which indicted him.2 37 On
appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the court questioned
the statistics for not showing that all persons identified with Spanish
surnames were qualified to serve as grand jurors, stating:
230. Id. at 35-36.
231. Id.
232. See Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 279-80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (delineating
categories of rights and stating "[r]ights which are waiveable only, as well as absolute sys-
temic requirements and prohibitions, cannot be made subject to rules of procedural
default .... ).
233. Turner, 476 U.S. at 35.
234. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
235. Id. at 483-85.
236. Id at 486-87.
237. Id at 488-89.
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How many of those listed in the census figures with Mexican-Ameri-
can names were not citizens of the state, but were so-called 'wet-
backs' from the south side of the Rio Grande; how many were mi-
grant workers and not residents of Hidalgo County; how many were
illiterate and could not read and write; how many were not of sound
mind and good moral character, how many had been convicted of a
felony or were under indictment or legal accusation of theft or a fel-
ony; none of these facts appear in the record 38
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals viewed the absence of this infor-
mation as a failure by Partida to establish a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation. Additionally, the court determined discrimination could not have
occurred because a majority of the elected positions in Hidalgo County
were held by Mexican Americans and elected officials would not discrim-
inate against those who voted for them. 9P
Once the case reached the United States Supreme Court, the holding
of the Texas court was overturned. The Court held that through the pres-
entation of statistics showing the great disparity, Partida had indeed
presented a prima facie case of discrimination which the State of Texas
was required to rebut.2' The United States Supreme Court rejected the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' reliance on the fact that a majority of
the elected offices in Hidalgo County were held by Mexican Americans,
the "governing majority" theory, to hold Partida had not proven discrimi-
nation in the selection of grand jurors.?'" The Supreme Court reiterated
its rejection of the theory that persons of the same race will not discrimi-
nate against each other. The Supreme court also rejected the Texas
court's reasons as to why more Mexican Americans did not serve on
grand juries. Perhaps it was the use of the derogatory term "wet-back,"
which the Supreme Court felt necessary to quote in its opinion, that
helped convince the Supreme Court that Mexican-American defendants
in Texas are indeed discriminated against because of their ethnicity.
Although it has been nearly three decades since the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals referred to Mexican Americans as "wet-backs," the
Saldano II opinion makes clear that the court still does not realize the
seriousness of the problem presented by racism in the criminal justice
system. This is particularly evident because the court, in Saldano II, will
not admit that every person has the fundamental right to a trial free from
racial prejudice of any sort, whether at trial or in the grand jury process.
238. Id. at 498 (quoting Partida v. State, 506 S.W.2d 209,211 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974),
overruled by Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977)).
239. Partida, 506 S.W.2d at 211.
240. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 496-98.
241. 1d at 499.
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IV. CRInCISM OF SALDANO II
A. The Introduction of Race into Trial Has Long Been Discouraged
by the Courts
As has been demonstrated, courts have strongly discouraged references
to race in both criminal and civil trials. 42 Most reported cases addressing
racial references in trials have used language that is clear in its criticism:
"[ilt was so repulsive to every idea of a fair trial as to cause us to have no
hesitancy in holding it reversible error .... This sort of procedure will
not be tolerated .... ";141 "It was an inflammatory appeal to
prejudice .... It was the arraignment of a race not on trial .... The
course pursued in this case was one that no court of justice ought for a
moment to tolerate; and it certainly must be true that the judge who tried
this case did not fully understand the language.., or he would not have
permitted it, - - would have rebuked, and ought to have punished its au-
thor;" 2' "Race and color are also a matter of indifference .... A jury of
white men cannot be called on to determine the credibility of witnesses
on the theory that the Caucasian race has a monopoly on the virtues of
truth and veracity and people of other races, by virtue of their color, are
inbred with dishonest and perjury without implanting in the minds of ju-
rors the deepest and most ineradicable type of prejudice;" 245 "This 'us'
against 'them' argument is also nothing more than an appeal to ethnic or
national origin prejudice which is constitutionally impermissible;" '246 "The
introduction of this irrelevant material prejudiced appellant by casting
him in the eyes of the jury as a member of a group with values allegedly
alien to the rest of society, and therefore implying that it was more likely
that he committed the crime charged;"247 "We reverse because attempts
to attribute criminal conduct to a defendant based on racial or ethnic
background have been uniformly condemned by the courts of this state.
These tactics have been found to be fundamental error and reversal has
occurred when there has been a failure to object and move for mis-
trial;" '48 "It was totally unnecessary and clearly contrary to the interests
of the state in bringing convicted criminals to justice for the prosecutor to
introduce this kind of hatred-engendering forensics. We cannot let the
242. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 n.30 (1987) (listing cases forbidding
use of race in criminal justice system). See generally Landis, supra note 65.
243. Derrick v. State, 272 S.W. 458, 459 (Tex. Crim. App. 1925).
244. Moss v. Sanger, 75 Tex. 321, 12 S.W. 619, 620 (1889).
245. Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Haywood, 153 Tex. 242, 266 S.W.2d 855, 859
(1954).
246. Guerra v. Collins, 916 F.Supp 620 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
247. Commonwealth v. "Ifrado, 375 A.2d 336, 338 (Pa. 1977).
248. Terrazas v. State, 696 So.2d 1309, 1310 (Fla. App. 2. Dist. 1997) (citations
omitted).
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death penalty stand under these circumstances; '249 "To sentence an indi-
vidual to death on the basis of a proceeding tainted by racial bias would
violate the most basic values of our criminal justice system. ' '25°
In the case of Victor Hugo Saldano, however, the Texas Court of Crim-
inal Appeals refused to discuss, much less discourage or condemn, the use
of race in his death penalty punishment proceeding.5 1 In fact, the court
failed to admonish the State's attorney for using such evidence in a capi-
tal sentencing proceeding and did not point out the trial judge's duty to
ensure Mr. Saldano's trial was free from racial taint. 52 Mr. Saldano's
case did not involve a simple reference to race or prosecutorial argument
regarding race, it involved the actual admission of race evidence, evi-
dence the jury could take into the jury room and use in its deliberations.
But because the defense attorney failed to object to the testimony, the
court refused to consider the merits of Mr. Saldano's complaint about the
introduction of race into his sentencing proceeding.
253
B. Hiding Behind the Contemporaneous Objection Rule
The Court of Criminal Appeals shielded itself from having to discuss
the impropriety of introducing Dr. Quijano's race-based testimony by
holding that such a discussion was unnecessary because the issue had not
been preserved for appellate review.5 Had the attorney objected, the
court would have been required to reverse Mr. Saldano's death sentence
"unless the court determine[d] beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
did not contribute to the ... punishment.",2 5 There is no doubt that
precedent would have required the reversal had an objection been
made. 256 However, because no objection was made in Mr. Saldano's
case, the Court of Criminal Appeals simply refused to address the
issue.5 7
The court even failed to admonish the State for using such evidence. It
is as if the court did not even recognize that the introduction of race, as a
249. Dawson v. State, 734 P.2d 221 (Nev. 1987).
250. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28,43 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
251. Saldano v. State, 70 S.W. 3d 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
252. See Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Haywood, 153 Tex. 242, 266 S.W.2d 855, 859-
60 (1954) (stating trial judge has duty to ensure trial is free of racial taint).
253. Saldano, 70 S.W.3d at 890.
254. Id.
255. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a), 44.2(a)
256. See Derrick v. State, 272 S.W. 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 1925) (objection made to
racial remarks and case reversed); Hatton v. State, 125 Tex. Crim. 56,66 S.W.2d 331 (1933)
(objection made to racial remarks and case reversed); Dinklage v. State, 185 S.WN.2d 573
(Tex. Crim. App. 1945) (objection made to racial remarks and case reversed).
257. Saldano, 70 S.W.3d at 890.
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permissible factor upon which to sentence a defendant to death, consti-
tuted racial discrimination. Attorney General John Comyn recognized it
as such, calling it "repugnant and offensive," and taking the extraordinary
step of confessing error before the United States Supreme Court.258
Texas appellate courts have stated it is unethical for attorneys to appeal
to race and that it is the duty of the judge to admonish attorneys for doing
so." The Court of Criminal Appeals did not tell the State in Saldano H
that there was anything wrong with the prosecution's introduction of Dr.
Quijano's testimony regarding the correlation between race and incarcer-
ation. This can only lead to a belief that it is permissible for the State to
introduce this type of evidence and appropriate for defense counsel not
to object to it.260 The State did introduce this evidence in several other
death penalty cases, with both Hispanic and African-American defend-
ants.2 6 ' Thankfully, the Texas Legislature has ensured it will not happen
again. In direct response to the original opinion issued in Saldano I, the
Legislature amended Texas Rule of Criminal Procedure article 37.071 by
prohibiting the State's use of race as a factor the jury can consider in
capital sentencing proceedings.262 The Court of Criminal Appeals failed
to tell the State the introduction of race was impermissible; the Texas
Legislature had to do that. It appears the court felt that if a defense at-
torney did not lodge an objection to the unconstitutional interjection of
race in the punishment proceeding, the court was not obliged to review
such interjection.263 Such a belief, however, presupposes that the defense
attorney recognized the offensive nature of Dr. Quijano's testimony.264
More troublesome is the Court's implicit approval of not only the
State's use of race as evidence of a capital defendant's future dangerous-
ness, but the approval as "trial strategy" of a defense attorney's use of
race in a capital sentencing proceeding.265 The court in Saldano 11 cites
258. See Bob Richter, District Attorneys, AG at Odds Over Legislation, SAN ANToNio
EXPRESs-NEws, Apr. 3, 2001, at 10A.
259. See Tex. Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Haywood, 153 Tex. 242,266 S.W.2d 856, 859-60
(1954) (stating it is unethical for attorney to use race-based argument or cross-examination
and duty of judge to prevent such use); Moss v. Sanger, 75 Tex. 321, 12 S.W. 619, 620 (Tex.
1889) (stating trial court would have rebuked and punished attorney who made race-based
remarks if it had understood attorney's remarks).
260. But see TEx. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2001)
(now prohibiting State's use of race in capital sentencing proceeding).
261. Press Release, supra note 34 (listing other cases).
262. TEx. CODE CRiM. P. ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
263. See Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 886 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (holding defense
attorney's have had trial strategy reasons for not objecting).
264. See Howell, supra note 26.
265. Saldano, 70 S.W.3d at 886 n.49.
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with approval the case of Garcia v. State,26 6 in which the defense attorney
for Garcia introduced Dr. Quijano's testimony regarding the same evi-
dence as testified to in Mr. Saldano's trial. Garcia argued on appeal that
this was ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Criminal Appeals
found that the introduction by the defense counsel of Dr. Quijano's testi-
mony was "trial strategy," and therefore did not represent ineffective as-
sistance of counsel.267 Ironically, even though both Justice Johnson and
Justice Price dissented in Saldano II, they both joined in the unanimous
judgment affirming Garcia's death sentence.
The court also held in Saldano II that the failure to object to the State's
proffer of this evidence is not ineffective assistance of counsel.3' These
rulings by the Court of Criminal Appeals, apparently approving consider-
ation of race by the jury in determining a defendant's future dangerous-
ness, leave defendants in Mr. Saldano's position with no possible avenue
of relief: the error is waived on appeal if it is not objected to at trial26 9
and it is not ineffective assistance of counsel for the attorney to fail to
object.270 -
C. Court Should Have Recognized that the Introduction of Race in a
Capital Sentencing Proceeding is Fundamental Error
In Saldano II, the Court of Criminal Appeals failed to cite Rule 103(d)
of the Texas Rules of Evidence regarding fundamental error, even though
Mr. Saldano had requested relief under this rule in the original submis-
sion of the case.2 71 The closest the majority came to addressing the rule
was when it cited Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure 72 which is the federal rule allowing courts to review errors not ob-
jected to which affect a defendant's substantial rights.273 The court stated
such errors are known as fundamental errors in Texas.274 Under Rule
52(b) the federal courts may reverse cases in which the error not objected
to was plain, affected the defendant's substantial rights, and the error was
such that "it 'seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputa-
266. 57 S.W.3d 436 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
267. Id. at 441.
268. Saldano, 70 S.W.3d at 886.
269. Id.; T.x. R. App. P. 33.1.
270. Cf. Garcia, 57 S.W. at 440-41 (defense attorney's admission of race factor evi-
dence not ineffective assistance of counsel).
271. See Saldano v. State, No. 72,556, slip op. at 10 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 1999),
vacated by 530 U.S. 1212 (2000).
272. Saldano, 70 S.W.3d at 887 n.58.
273. FED. R. CRiM. P. 52(b).
274. Saldano, 70 S.W.3d at 887.
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tion of judicial proceedings.' ,275 Although the court cited Rule 52(b), it
did not rely on it for its holding. Instead, the Court reiterated the catego-
ries of error,2 76 and, without any meaningful analysis, held the error
about which Mr. Saldano complained of to not be one of the two types
that may be raised on appeal absent an objection at trial.277 The court,
even by way of analogy, did not explain why the use of race in Mr.
Saldano's trial did not affect his substantial rights or "affect the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. '278 Since the court
chose to take a different path than the other courts have historically cho-
sen, one would think that the court would want to elaborate on its rea-
soning as to why this does not constitute fundamental error. Had the
court analyzed the error meaningfully and studied how various courts
have treated the interjection of race into trials, it would have realized that
the interjection of race into Mr. Saldano's capital sentencing proceeding
was fundamental error.
As set out above, courts have universally condemned the interjection
of race into trials. Further, the United States Supreme Court has en-
gaged in "unceasing efforts to eradicate racism" in the criminal justice
system. 279 This is especially true in capital punishment proceedings
where the Supreme Court has stated that "[b]ecause of the range of dis-
cretion entrusted to a jury in a capital sentencing hearing, there is a
unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate .... 'The Court... has
recognized that the qualitative difference of death from all other punish-
ments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital
sentencing determination. ' ' 280  When dealing with the issue of racial
prejudice, people who have racially-biased beliefs that minorities are
more violence prone might bring those beliefs into the deliberation pro-
cess in deciding if the defendant is likely to be a danger in the future.28 '
Herein lies the problem: Mr. Saldano's case allowed evidence into the
proceeding that tends to confirm baseless prejudices already held in the
minds of the jurors.282 His case did not involve racial discrimination in
choosing the jury283 or grand jury;284 rather, the admission of the race
275. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 389 (1999).
276. Saldano, 70 S.W.3d at 887-89.
277. Id. at 889.
278. See Jones, 527 U.S. at 389 (establishing the standard).
279. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1969).
280. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986) (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S.
992, 998-99 (1983)). In Turner, the Supreme Court candidly discussed the issues of both
overt and subtle racial attitudes which could influence a juror's decision in a case. Id,
281. Id. at 39.
282. Cf. at 35-36.
283. See, e.g., Baston, 476 U.S. 79.
284. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986).
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factor testimony actually allowed evidence to be presented to the jury
that could have served to confirm already held prejudices or that could
sway a juror into believing the proposition that a particular ethnic group
is somehow inferior.
As Attorney General John Cornyn stated, the use of race in Mr.
Saldano's trial was "repugnant and offensive."' To punish a person be-
cause he was born into a particular ethnic group is indeed repugnant and
offensive. Both Congress and the Texas Legislature agree on this point
and have passed laws prohibiting the introduction or consideration of
race in a capital sentencing proceeding.286 Clearly, in light of the Saldano
II decision, it is only the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals that fails to
understand the error of using a person's race in deciding if he lives or
dies.
Additionally problematic is the fact that the introduction of this race-
based evidence creates divisiveness in society. It is state-based race
discrimination at its worst 2 The Court of Criminal Appeals' tacit ap-
proval of the use of race as a factor in the future dangerousness determi-
nation sends the struggle for racial harmony back to its beginnings.
In the past, when race-based remarks were made at trial, the courts
were quick to condemn it and to chastise those who introduced it?89 The
courts also recognized that a harmless error analysis was incapable of be-
ing applied to such trial errors because there was no way by which to
gauge the harmful effects.29 The United States Supreme Court recog-
nizes that harmful effects cannot be determined when the error is in al-
285. See Richter, supra note 258.
286. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(f) (requiring jury instruction prohibiting consideration of
race in reaching capital sentencing decision); TEX. CODE C.tim. P. ANN. art. 37.071,
§ 2(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2001) (prohibiting State's introduction of race as factor for jury to
consider in determining future dangerousness).
287. Cf. Tex. Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Guerrero, 800 S.V.2d 859,865 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1990, writ denied) (stating race-based remarks are "an attack on the social glue
that helps bind society together"); People v. Thomas, 514 N.Y.S.2d 91, 93 (App. Div. 1987)
(stating vice of racial jury argument is divisiveness it creates).
288. Cf. United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 355-56 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 829 (1999) (stating race discrimination in justice system is "especially pernicious").
289. See, eg., Tex. Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Haywood, 153 Tex. 242, 266 S.V.2d 856,
859-60 (1954) (stating it is unethical for attorney to use race-based argument or cross-
examination and duty of judge to prevent such use); Moss v. Sanger, 75 Tex. 321, 12 S.W.
619, 620 (1889) (stating trial court would have rebuked and punished attorney who made
race-based remarks if he had understood attorney's remarks).
290. Guerrero, 800 S.W.2d at 863. Cf. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 574 (1979)
(holding error in discriminatory selection of grand jurors not subject to harm analysis); see
Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (stat-
ing impossible to measure effect on jury).
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lowing the racially discriminatory selection of grand jurors,291 or when
the prosecutor uses racial discrimination in making his charging deci-
sion.292 Likewise, the harmful effect cannot be gauged when a person's
race is used to determine his future dangerousness and a curative instruc-
tion cannot remove the taint from the jurors' minds, thereby eliminating
the need for an objection.293 The court's inability to determine the harm-
ful effect, the historical condemnation of the use of race in the justice
system and laws passed preventing the use of race in capital sentencing
proceedings, as well as society's recognition that racism will not be toler-
ated, dictate that it was fundamental error for the State to introduce the
testimony of Dr. Quijano concerning race as a permissible aggravating
factor upon which the jury was allowed to base its sentencing decision.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court of Criminal Appeals' failure to recognize the use of race in
Mr. Saldano's trial as fundamental error suggests the court is of the opin-
ion his punishment proceeding was fair. But how fair is it for the court to
hide behind the contemporaneous objection rule, stating the error was
waived by the defense attorney's failure to object, and then to tell Mr.
Saldano that his lawyer's failure to object was not ineffective assistance of
counsel?
Looking at Saldano II in light of historical precedent, it is apparent that
something may be seriously wrong in the Texas Criminal Justice System, a
system which allows the State to actually introduce such evidence in more
than one case, a system in which more than one defense lawyer fails to
object, a system in which not one, but several trial judges allow race-
based evidence in, and a system in which the highest criminal appellate
court refuses even to discuss the merits of the issue.
Racial appeals are not just wrong based on our belief system. They are
irrelevant in these cases and, more importantly, are contrary to estab-
lished legal principles-the very same established legal principles which
our criminal justice system is built on. The historical legal trend through-
out the nation has been towards eradicating racial prejudice from the
criminal justice system. In some parts of Texas, courts appear to be less
sensitive towards racial appeals in the courtroom. It seems odd that
judges in Texas from the late 1800s were more enlightened in their intol-
erance of racial bias than is our present Court of Criminal Appeals. It
291. Mitchell, 443 U.S. at 555-56.
292. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125, n.9 (1979).
293. Cf. Terrazas v. State, 696 So.2d 1309, 1310 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. 1997) (stating the
use of race at trial fundamental error); see Saldano, 70 S.W. 3d at 893 (Johnson, J., dissent-
ing) (stating impossible to measure effect).
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seems as though Saldano would have been more understandable, but still
incorrectly decided, had the opinion been delivered in the 1890s as op-
posed to the twenty-first century. Fortunately, any future use of testi-
mony like that in Mr. Saldano's case will no longer be admissible in the
sentencing portion of a death penalty case.
One has to wonder if the outcome of the case would have been differ-
ent if the very same type of evidence were introduced relating to a white
defendant in a court where the jury, judge, prosecutor and defense lawyer
were African Americans or Hispanics, and would there be a greater out-
cry? Simply stated, if one were to find a "doctor" that testified to the
propensity of violence as it related to a white man on trial for the murder
of an individual of color, would the public be outraged at such a charac-
terization of the white community? Of course the example is currently
unrealistic. But were the roles reversed, would the result of these cases
be different?
Based upon the historical precedent both within and outside the State
of Texas, it would seem that race or ethnicity should not be used for any
purpose at trial. As the Texas Supreme Court stated in Moss v. Sanger79
"Cases ought to be tried in a court of justice upon the facts proved; and
whether a party be Jew or gentile, white or black is a matter of
indifference." 295
294. 75 Tex. 321, 12 S.W. 619 (1889).
295. IdM at 620.
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